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""' ABSTRACT: "German Conduct of the War in Finland, August 19^+0 - June 19^1"
As an intregal component of "Unternehmen Barbarossa", OKW forces - in conjunction
with the Finnish armed forces - advanced on objectives in the Soviet Union. The Ger¬
man objectives were never attained; Murmansk was never occupied, the Murmansk Railway
was never effectively severed, AG Nord never linked with the Finnish Army on the Svir
River, Leningrad never fell. Every Germen offensive strategic objective in the far
north was unfulfilled. Despite the Finnish-German superiority of forces (sixteen Fin¬
nish and four and one-half German divisions opposed by six Soviet divisions) and tac¬
tical surprise, German strategy in Finland must be rated a dismal failure. And this
failure can be traced to three reasons, all interlocking: the unnecessary division of
command, the lack of sufficient forces and the dispersion of their efforts, the combat
conditions - terrain, transportion net, climate - in the Finnish theater. If a unified
command had been a reality, if originally planned forces had been available (if the de¬
fense of Norway had not been an obsession), if the forces that were available had not
been scattered, one or more German objectives might have been obtained. Given these
errors in OKH/OKW planning, the quality of the Finnish front precluded any exploita¬
tion of local advantages gained during combat.
Utilizing numerous historical studies and published and archival sources (primarily
of OKW, OKH, and Auswartiges Amt origins), this thesis traces the course of the Barbar¬
ossa planning and concentrates upon the role Finnish and German forces were expected
to fulfill during the initial strikes from Finnish territory. Commencing with the
initial decision to eliminate the Soviet Union and the resultant first tenuous contacts
with the Finnish military establishment, the Reich's growing interest and investment in
Finland is tracked. Concurrently, the timing and circumstances behind the decisions of
strategy, especially those that later proved disasterous, are examined. Interwoven with
the chronology of developing military cooperation is the political/diplomatic situation
where relevent. Together these facets form a pastiche of German-Finnish relations
in the period between the Winter War and the Barbarossa invasion.
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Prologue: March 19^-0 - August 19^0
"No country has displayed a more phenomenal capacity for beating ploughshares
into swords Ethan Germany]." - John Wheeler-Bennett.^
On the day military operations ceased along the Russo-Finnish fronts, 13
March 19^+0, Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim announced in an order of
the day to the troops of the Finnish forces that "the sacred mission of the
army is to be an outpost of Western civilization in the East."^ Brave words
for a brave people who, since 30 November 1939» had resisted the might of the
Red Army. Indeed this "numerically and technically inferior foe" had inflicted
approximately two hundred thousand casualties on the Soviet divisions involved.5
But the brave words could not wash away the bitter fact that the Soviet Union
had triumphed. Nor could they disguise the fact that the Finnish state had
suffered seriously as a result of the Winter War and the subsequent Treaty of
Moscow. Twenty-four thousand nine hundred Finns were listed dead or missing
and forty-three thousand five hundred were wounded as a result of the warfare.i+
The territories ceded by Finland under the terms of the Treaty of Moscow were
inhabited by nearly four hundred and fifty thousand citizens;-' the city of
Viipuri and its port, the ports of Hanko and Uuras and Koivisto, the north shore
of Lake La^o^a, the Saimaa Canal were surrendered;0 the railway system was dis¬
rupted by new borders and loss of rolling stock and track; important timber re¬
sources and hydroelectric plants and pulp mills, as well as thousands of small
farmsteads, fell to Soviet control. Of more concern for the Finnish government
in troubled times, the security of the nation in the east had been complicated.
The new frontier was longer, with fewer natural defensive positions, than the
former and ran nearer to vital centers. Established static defenses were lost;
the bunkers, trenches, automatic weapons pits, and anti-tank positions unde-
stroyed now lay in Russia. The Rybachi Peninsula, under complete Soviet control,
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enabled the Red Army to "command the entry to Petsamo harbor," Finland's sole
ice-free port in the far north.? And a Soviet garrison occupied the port of
Hanko on the Baltic coast, west of Helsinki. The Finnish Army could no longer
contemplate a delaying rearguard action, could no longer plan to trade terri¬
tory for time, time to mobilize and time to gather support from sympathetic
governments.^ With the losses sustained and the new frontiers, the Finnish
forces could no longer guarantee the integrity and security of the state.
Despite these realities, a sense of injustice animated the Finnish popu¬
lace. Foreign correspondents returning to Helsinki received the impression that
the Finns did not expect the peace to last. Open boasting occurred in the
Hotel Kamp of widespread sabotage to factories in the industrial areas ceded to
the Soviets. The important buildings of the capital remained protected against
air raids by ice encased in wooden forms. The Army remained partially mobi¬
lized, still under the direct command of Mannerheim.9 The Finnish High Command
instituted operational studies on the feasibility of recapturing the lost terri¬
tories; as early as May 19^0, the plans for the "Hiitola Offensive" were com¬
plete. Ambassador Wipert Carl Wilhelm von Blucher, head of the DGH, summarized
the prevailing mood in a telegram to the AA dated 13 March 19^+0; "since it is
not to be expected that the Finns will resign themselves definitely to the new
boundary, and since it is uncertain whether the Russians regard the peace as an
interim phase or temporary measure, further tension in the Baltic region must be
anticipated."^ "Finland was simply taking a pause for breath."^
German neutrality had been conspicuous during the course of the Winter War;
conspicuous for the benevolence displayed towards the Soviet Union. In the Eu¬
rope of the Nazi-Soviet entente, Finland lay within the designated Soviet sphere
of influence. Neither the AA nor the OKW were willing to tempt Soviet displea¬
sure by any overt sign of interest in the fate of Finland. Germany was too in¬
volved in the West to be concerned with a small cold corner of the north. In the
welter of Nazi bureaucracy only two departments of the AA, PolVI under counsellor
Werner von Grundherr and WV under Counsellor von Scherpenberg, were studying the
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coujse of events in Finland. Both departments, operating in conjunction, were
considering methods of obtaining various raw materials, notably the nickle out¬
put of the Kolosjoki mines of the Petsamo region, for the expanding German war
effort.^ Prompted by Grand Admiral Erich Eaeder Ob.d.M., on 1 April Hitler or¬
dered Weserubung initiated at 0515 hours on 9 April 19^0. Under consideration
since 27 January, when the Fuhrer had ordered studies of offensive/defensive op¬
tions for Germany in Scandinavia, the OKW-directed assault was swift and sure.
Finland now faced a new political reality. On the outcome of the German inva¬
sion would depend whether Finland was to retain any freedom of action. This ex¬
tended even to the Finnish economy; as von Blucher noted in a telegram to Berlin
on 19 April, if Norway were occupied by the Wehrmacht Finnish overseas trade
would come "under complete German control.A new Realpolitik began to invade
the policy of Finland in its relations with the Nazi Reich. During a brief con¬
versation with the Finnish envoy to Berlin, Aarne Wuorimaa, on 26 April Ernst von
Weizsacker, State Secretary of the AA, perceived "the conspicuous desire of the
minister to restore the intimate relationship which he maintained with us previ¬
ously."''^ And as von Blucher reported a few days later from Helsinki, the latest
news from Norway had "impressed Finnish public opinion deeply.On 18 May the
2nd Geb.Div. under Feurstein was ordered from Drontheim to positions in north
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Norway. D Battered Finland now lay bounded by a hostile Soviet Union and an in¬
different German Reich. As a report prepared by the WV stated, Finland retained
only one tenuous route to the Western powers that was not dominated by the Nazi-
Soviet entente, the ice-free port of Liinahamari.''^
The Helsinki government obviously decided that the best method of maintain¬
ing existence in the new Europe was to counter Soviet pressure by obtaining tacit
German patronage. Initially they attempted to gain surplus Wehrmacht arms and
munitions to supplement the depleted stocks of the Finnish Army in exchange for
vital raw materials. During the 28 March AA conference on Finnish resources, it
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was revealed that arrangements had been made to send Counsellor Karl Schnurre and
Senior Civil Servant Waldemar Ludwig to Helsinki for negotiations aimed at secur¬
ed -1 q
ing iron pyrites, nickie, copper, and molybdenum. Schnurre reported on the
course of negotiations, concluded on 6 May, at a conference on commercial policy
in Berlin on 16 May. The Finnish government was willing to supply the materials
desired if technical and diplomatic issues could be agreed upon; however, "it
will probably become necessary, in return, also to supply war material to the
Finns at least in a limited amount. The military aspect of the question will be
studied by the OKW, as soon as details of the Finn's wishes are available. Mean¬
while, the Foreign Ministry will ascertain whether the authoritative quarters
have any objections, on political grounds, to war material being supplied to Fin¬
land. On 21 May RAM Joachim von Ribbentrop discussed the matter with Hitler.
The Fuhrer, aware of the developing offensive in the west and the necessity of
keeping the Soviet Union pacified, decided that deliveries of arms "to Finland
are at present out of the question. It could not be foreseen at the moment when
this attitude might undergo a change."20 The WiRu was duly informed of the de¬
cree. The opening Finnish gambit had failed. For the Third Reich, Soviet amity
was still preferable to Finnish.
Ambassador von Blucher reported Soviet moves in the far north that could
threaten the German position. On 10 June the Norwegian armed forces capitulated.
Due to logistic difficulties, Wehrmacht forces had not yet advanced north of Nar¬
vik, leaving the vast province of Finnmark - which adjoined the Petsamo region -
unoccupied. A few kilometers east of Finnmark Soviet troops stood combat-ready;
it was rumored that the Red Army planned to advance into this military vacuum.
On 11 June, von Blucher reported to the Wilhelmstrasse of the fears of the Fin¬
nish General Staff that the Soviet Union was considering the acquisition of Finn-
mark via Petsamo. The Military Attache in the DGH, Colonel Horst Rossing, had
been informally told by Finnish officers that they hoped the Wehrmacht would has¬
ten to reach the Norwegian-Finnish border, currently held by two Norwegian infan-
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try battalions. Colonel Erich Buschenhagen, Chief of Staff AOK Norwegen, or¬
dered that the Norwegian border battalions be placed under direct German command.
On 12 June, Colonel Buschenhagen reported that the Norwegian High Command feared
a Soviet occupation of the area and had requested that an OKW garrison assume
responsibility for the security of the region. He requested permission to dis¬
patch a Waffen SS unit to the border immediately; he followed this request with
a cable to the OKW stating that Soviet troops were assembling along the Murman
coast for the purpose of advancing into Finnmark, information originating with
the Finnish General Staff. The OKW, however, doubted the interpretation of this
t
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intelligence and refused to hastily reinforce the area. The entire incident
shows the nature of concern displayed by German personnel, both diplomatic and
military, towards Soviet intentions in the north.
On 18 June von Blucher noted the Finnish reaction to the collapse of France,
"Recognition of the German leadership and of German soldiers finds spontaneous
expression everywhere. Mixed in are voices which speak of a new and better Eu¬
rope and perceive in a German hegemony a guarantee against the danger from the
east."^3 The leaders of the conservative Coalition Party urged that the Finnish
government take an "undemonstratively" sympathetic stance with regard to the Ger-
pl±
man Reich and be most cooperative in all negotiations with Berlin. Trade talks
between Finland and Germany progressed amiably. Von Blucher reported that the
Foreign Minister of Finland, Rolf Witting, was so disposed towards him that they
met almost daily to confer with each other in perfect confidence and candor.^
During one such conversation, Witting voiced doubts about the suitability of his
envoy in Berlin in the developing atmosphere. He was of the opinion that "Wuori-
maa was not sufficiently active"; perhaps a new representative should be dis¬
patched to Berlin in view of the "new attitude to Germany," perhaps someone like
of
Toivo M. Kivimaki. Kivimaki was evaluated by von Blucher as one of Finland's
most capable and respected statesmen, an expert on German affairs, and "the Fin¬
nish politician best suited to represent Finland in Germany.To be concise,
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Toivo Kivimaki was an ardent Germanophile. On 6 May the Finnish government was
informed that the German Reich would be pleased to welcome Kivimaki as the Fin¬
nish envoy in Berlin. With Witting in Helsinki and Kivimaki in Berlin, Finland's
political and economic reorientation toward the Nazi Reich was to proceed uner¬
ringly.
In June came warnings of the threat Soviet military presence in Europe pre¬
sented to the German Reich and information of a gradual Soviet military buildup
by General Ludwig Beck, former Chief of the Gen.St.d.H., and Hasso von Etzdorf,
AA Liaison Officer to the OKH. Colonel General Franz Haider, current head of the
Gen.St.d.H., met at the end of the month with von Weizsacker, who briefed him on
Hitler's view of the political situation. Attention was now focused on the east,
von Weizsacker explained; this was not due to recent Soviet expansion, but rather
pQ
was an integral component of Hitler's grand strategy. Field Marshal Walter von
Brauchitsch Ob.d.H. directed Haider to introduce planning - simultaneous with but
secondary to OKH planning directed against Great Britain - on "how a military
blow against Russia is to be executed to induce her to recognize the dominant
role of Germany in Europe."^9 Von Brauchitsch, flushed with victory and impa¬
tient to prove that the OKH could complete the establishment of a German hege¬
mony over Europe, declared that the "OKH shall not be caught unprepared."5® The
initial operational planning for the eastern campaign began on 3 July 19^0 when
Haider ordered Colonel Hans von Greiffemberg of the Op.Abt. of the Gen.St.d.H. to
study "how to deliver a military blow at Russia.
When von Brauchitsch arrived for the Fuhrer Conference on 21 July, Hitler
was unaware of OKH planning. Thus, he approached the subject of an offensive in
the east guardedly, presenting it as a preventive strike. According to Haider,
a draft was submitted to Hitler immediately outlining the concentration, objec¬
tives, and comparative strengths for an autumn campaign into Soviet territory.^
An optimistic proposal, it suggested that by utilizing eighty to one hundred
divisions Germany could easily defeat the Red Army before winter fell, allowing
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four to six weeks for the concentration of forces. The military aims were loose¬
ly expressed as "the defeat of the Russian army or the capture of at least as
much Russian territory as necessary to prevent enemy air attacks against Berlin
and the Silesian industrial areas."33 The discussion that followed the presenta¬
tion of the study indicated three operational routes - "Finland, Baltic States,
Ukraine.Finland's assumed cooperation would be profitable for the Finns;
parts of northern Russia were to be surrendered to their control.After the
offensive was successfully concluded, Finland was to become a link in a chain of
buffer states meant to stretch from the White Sea to the Black Sea.^° Hitler
ordered the planning to be continued. This did not mean, however, that an irre¬
vocable decision to launch a military campaign had been taken.5? But it did mean
that Finland's position, due to the possibility of military collaboration, was
reevaluated. Nov;, as a potential staging area for a German assault, the patron¬
age sought by the Finnish government was to be initiated, with all due caution.
On 26 July, after examining new material on Soviet dispositions presented
by Colonel Eberhard Kinzel of Fr.H.Ost, Haider concluded that the most favorable
operation would be a thrust along the Baltic coast swinging south via Moscow to
strike the forces in the Ukraine. When von Greiffenberg presented a recommenda¬
tion for a more realistic approach with the primary blow in the Ukraine, Haider
repeated his preference for an enormous flanking operation. The Finnish Army
would perforce be of extreme importance in the offensive envisioned by Haider.
In this rudimentary plan the Finnish armed forces, with supportive Luftwaffe air-
power and specialist land units, were to strike the Soviet forces to the south
and southeast, advancing on Leningrad and the Svir River simultaneously with the
advance of the main Wehrmacht forces through the Baltic States. After linking
with the OKH forces, the Finns were to provide flank security against Soviet
forces to the east during the massive southern envelopment. On 29 July Haider
decided to seek a further opinion and summoned Major General Erich Marcks, Chief
of Staff 18th Army, and charged him with the conduct of an independent feasibi-
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ity study for an eastern strike.^
Shortly after the 21 July conference Hitler requested the views of Field
Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, head of the OKW, and General Alfred Jodl, head of the
WFST., for their views on the proposed offensive; in a memorandum signed by
Keitel and probably drafted by Jodl, they replied that time, space, and weather
factors rendered an autumn attack on Soviet Russia "totally impracticable."^9
On 31 July 19^-0 von Brauchitsch, Haider, Raeder, Keitel, and Jodl gathered
at the Berghof for yet another Fuhrer Conference. Hitler, although the OKL was
not represented, gave orders for the commencement of a massive air offensive a-
gainst Great Britain. He then announced that "Russia must be defeated in the
course of this struggle. Spring 19^1." In Hitler's view, "the winning of a
certain area would not be enough." The strategic aim must be "the destruction
of Russia's vital power." Further, the operation would make sense only if this
aim could be achieved in a single campaign completed in five months. The Fuhrer
envisioned two main thrusts, one towards Kiev and down the Dnieper and one
l± 1
through the Baltic States and towards Moscow."" The OKH was to be increased to
one hundred eighty full divisions and Rumanian and Finnish forces were to be
strengthened. Haider noted that Finland's attitude remained to be seen, but if
willing to cooperate, the Finnish Army would presumably advance towards the White
k2
Sea. For German forces operating on or from Finnish territory only three oper¬
ational possibilities were feasible - namely, an advance on the Murmansk Railway,
the occupation and defense of Petsamo, and a strike across the southeast border
Aj.3
into the extended Soviet right flank. The conference led the OKH/OKW to seek
methods of increasing the ability of potential allies, Finland and Rumania, to
LL
resist Soviet pressure while at full military expansion themselves.
The "potential ally" was still attempting to gain German attention; "the
eyes of leading Finnish statesmen are turning to Berlin.On ^ July Witting,
during a conversation with von Blucher, informed the Ambassador that popular sen¬
timent amiable to the Reich was developing "in avalanche proportions." Efforts
9
to form a government oriented exclusively towards Berlin were progressing. Pub¬
lic opinion was influenced by the firm belief that Finland, supported by German
arms, could recover the lost territories. This general opinion had been encour¬
aged by correspondence and discussion between private citizens of the two na-
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tions. Von Blucher was cautious, replying that, in his personal opinion, Ger¬
many would respect all agreements with the Soviet Union; he stated that a govern¬
ment which cooperated secretly but which was outwardly distant and reserved
would be preferable to one with an obvious pro-German bias.'4^ Between 29 July
and 14 August Kivimaki paid several visits to the Wilhelmstrasse in an effort to
determine Nazi interest. He expressed his "grave concern for the future of his
KO
country" to Ernst Woermann. He attempted to question von Weizsacker on German
policy in the event of any renewed Soviet-Finnish conflict. He visited Woermann
and "repeatedly brought up the question of whether we {GermanyJ would not support
Finland ... in case of a renewed advance on the part of the Soviet Union."^9 Ki¬
vimaki was unaware, as was the DGH, that German support had already been decided
upon by this point. On 2 August, von Blucher reported that Finnish leaders
might be prepared to agree to "a considerable curtailment to the sovereignty of
their country in favor of Germany."50
Major General Marcks submitted his plan of operations on 5 August. Marcks
recognized the significance of the Murmansk Railway; but he envisioned a massive
concentration of Wehrmacht forces in the central and southern sectors of the
front, leaving northern Russia and, thus, Finnish participation out of the first
phase of operations. Marcks recommended postponing the decision on whether or
not to attempt to gain Finnish cooperation to a later stage in planning.On 9
August the OKW issued the preliminary order "Aufbau Ost" that began the general
shift of the Wehrmacht eastwards, including units in the north.5^ Aufbau Ost was
"entirely camouflaged, not mentioning the USSR nor the eventual attack."55 jn
t
July 1940 an SS bajjlalion under Lieutenant Colonel Reitz had moved into the Kir-
kenes region.5~r On 13 August Hitler returned to Berlin; on 14 August he met with
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Colonel General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, WB Norwegen, and ordered him to shift
the entire Gebirgskorps (comprising the 2nd and J>vd Geb.Div. with support units)
to occupy the northern region.55 The next day von Falkenhorst passed these or¬
ders to General Eduard Dietl, Commander Gebirgskorps;5^ in days the 136th Jager
Regiment was installed in the Kirkenes-Tana sector only a few kilometers from the
Finnish border.5? The OKL was ordered to establish combat airbases in the north-
58ern region.J
The OKW viewed the strengthening of the Finnish forces as a prime prerequi¬
site to creating a viable offensive force for any joint Finnish-German operation.
Amid rumors of a threatened Soviet offensive against Finland,59 the decision was
made. Keitel informed von Weizsacker on 12 August that the Fuhrer had given per¬
mission that an arms contract between the Danish firm Madsen and the Finnish Ar¬
my, interrupted by the occupation of Denmark in April, be completed with German
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approval.ou But more than the limited munitions supplied by Madsen were needed.
At the end of June and again at the beginning of August, W. Hilbert of the Fin¬
nish firm Dahberg and Hilbert had travelled privately to Germany to contact Jo¬
seph Veltjens, a retired pilot now in the arms export trade, in an attempt to
purchase arms and munitions. Martti V. Tera, retired from the Finnish military
establishment and associated with Dahberg and Hilbert, supplied Hilbert with a
list of materials desired by the Finnish armed forces which Hilbert made known to
Veltjens.0''
Veltjens had flown with the celebrated Richthofen Jagdgeschwader and thus
served under the command of Hermann Goring during the 1917-1918 period. Follow¬
ing the First World War Veltjens entered the financial world and soon founded J.
Veltjens Waffen und Munition and Aschpurvis und Veltjens, a marine transport en¬
terprise. Veltjens initiated and maintained close commercial ties with Finland
and was involved in supplying thirty 20-mm anti-aircraft guns with ammunition in
October 1939« On several occasions during the Winter War Veltjens attempted to
persuade Goring, now Reichsmarshall and Ob.d.L., to intercede with Hitler to lift
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the ban on arms to Finland, even as late as mid-February 19^0. Thus, on 1*f Au¬
gust when Hitler discussed the Finnish situation and the decision to aid the
Finns in rearming with Goring, Goring immediately offered the services of Velt-
£p
jens as an agent - a Sondermissar - to open negotiations.0 The same day Gener¬
al Georg Thomas, head of the WiRu, recorded, "with Herr Veltjens present, deliv¬
eries to Finland were discussed. The Reichsmarschal explained that the Fuhrer
wished speedy and extensive deliveries to Finland, since he did not want to give
the Finns over to the Russians. Veltjens was instructed to inform Mannerheim
and, after clarification of the situation, to communicate the wishes of the Finns
to the Armaments Office JWiRuJ. Transportation would be mainly on the ships car¬
rying Swedish ore. Veltjens was also to request from Mannerheim that we be per¬
mitted to transport flak units through Finland on the highway from Petsamo to
Kirkenes. At the desire of the Fuhrer there should be made available to the
Finns as a first priority antitank mines in large quantity for antitank defense."0^
The request for a transit of Finnish territory by OKL personnel and equipment
seems to have been proposed by Goring to alleviate the transport difficulties en¬
countered by the order to establish OKL defenses in remote northern Norway. The
twin facets of Veltjens' mission were not conditional upon each other; the arms
offer was not linked to the transit proposal at any stage. Veltjens had been
ordered to demand an audience solely with Mannerheim. Why the Field Marshal and
not a member of the government? Hitler obviously felt, for this stipulation had
been his, that Mannerheim was less likely to allow politics to enter the consid¬
erations and, perhaps, felt that the military would be more apt to maintain the
65
secrecy the affair demanded. y
On 15 August Veltjens visited the Finnish embassy in Berlin. There he in¬
formed Kivimaki of his mission, stressed the secrecy necessary, and requested
that an audience with Mannerheim be arranged for 18 August. He also requested
that a letter of introduction to Mannerheim be dispatched. Kivimaki complied.
The letter informing Mannerheim of the Veltjens visit arrived on 17 August, de-
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livered personally by a Baron V/rede. While Velt.jens had requested to meet with
Mannerheim solely and, thus, for the Finnish envoy to communicate solely with
Mannerheim, Kivimaki also informed Witting by telegram on 17 August.^ The long
loneliness was over. And for the Reich, the initial advance in military strategy
in the far north had been taken.
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First Phase: August 19^0 - October 19^0
"Now I am beginning to see a tiny ray of light in the intense darkness." - at-
A
tributed to Rudolf Walden.
When Veltjens arrived in Helsinki on 17 August, he was met and taken to Hu¬
bert's summer villa, there to engage in a series of conversations with Hilbert
p
and Tera. Veltjens outlined his instructions; he was, he stated, to place a
double proposition before Mannerheim. First, the government of the Reich was now
willing to release the confiscated arms - one hundred seventy-eight antiquated
naval guns originally destined for Finland to supplement its efforts in the Win¬
ter War and seized by OKW forces in the course of Weserubung - or replace them
with others of similar calibre of German manufacture. These were to constitute
a reserve in the event of a general Russo-Finnish conflict. In addition, cer¬
tain other war surplus material could be transferred. The entire transaction was
to be rigorously secret, with no detail committed to writing. The transportation
of the material was to be Finland's responsibility. Secondly, Veltjens was to
discover if, in principle, the Finns would consent to the transit by OKL person¬
nel from Finnish ports to northern Norway. While transport routes existed by sea
and Sweden to Finnmark, all were problematic.^ Veltjens then asked Hilbert and
Tera for advice on how best to approach the Field Marshal. He was warned that
Mannerheim would probably decline to give a decision on the transit request since
this was patently political in nature and beyond his authority. He was also ad¬
vised not to make the arms offer conditional upon the granting of transit rights;^
a rather useless precaution since the OKL request and OKW offer had from concep¬
tion been separate initiatives and were both handled by Veltjens merely for con¬
venience.
At some point during the course of the day, Veltjens made his way to the DGH
and met with von Blucher. Von Blucher had previously received the disquieting
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information that an attempt to initiate relations between the Finnish authorities
and a German department not under the scrutiny of the AA was being made.5 The
Ambassador was informed by Veltjens that the Fuhrer had "made a decisive turn" in
policy and would satisfy the desires of the Finnish Army for arms "in every re¬
spect."^1 This revelation took von Blucher totally unprepared and he refused to
give it full belief without confirmation. Feeling the matter too delicate for
telegraphic treatment, he dispatched Colonel Rossing to Berlin to obtain verbal
verification from von Grundherr. While still in Germany, Rossing telephoned the
DGH substantiating the claims made by Veltjens.^ From this point in time, the AA
and the DGH were to be involved in, and informed of, the developing German-Fin-
O
nish relationship to a lesser and progressively lesser degree.
On 17 August, Mannerheim received a telegram from Kivimaki requesting that
he be present at the Malm airfield personally on the morning of the following day
to accept an important communication.^ Mannerheim, accompanied by Major General
Rudolf Walden, Finnish Minister of Defense, and Lieutenant General Erik Hein-
richs, Finnish Chief of Staff, and joined by Witting at the field met Baron Wrede
on 18 August. Mannerheim read the note, acquainted Walden and Witting with its
10
contents, and agreed to converse informally with Veltjens during the evening. w
Heinrichs, the only military professional besides his commander present, was not
informed of the body of the note.
Veltjens presented the dual propositions to Mannerheim in private in Helsin¬
ki. The Field Marshal responded to the arms offer with satisfaction; Finland's
11
armed forces were in truely desperate straits v/ith respect to material. The
Reich envoy stipulated that the arms transaction would be completed quietly and
through commercial channels, notably by reactivating and expanding the arms con-
12
tract, conducted through a Danish intermediary, interrupted by the Winter War.
The Field Marshal foresaw no difficulty. Veltjens then presented a personal note
from Goring to Mannerheim, a note inquiring if Finland would grant permission for
the transit of Luftv/affe personnel and equipment via the western Finnish rail and
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road network to Norway, such as Sweden had granted on 5 July.^ Mannerheim hesi¬
tated. He pointed out that questions of such nature were matters of state and
for the civil authorities to decide. While, as head of the military he could
procure arms and supplies wherever feasible, he could not arbitrarily agree, even
ih
tenatively, to allow German troops transit of Finnish territory. ^ Mannerheim
then suggested that Veltjens contact Witting, and offered to arrange such a meet¬
ing. ^5 Veltjens replied that, as special envoy for Hitler, he was authorised to
speak only to Mannerheim. Further, a definite answer was required in Berlin by
20 August on this matter. After some thought, Mannerheim proposed that, as head
of Finland's forces, he would contact Eisto Ryti, Prime Minister. The Prime Min-
y\ r
ister would make the decision and Mannerheim would inform Veltjens. Veltjens
agreed; while taking his leave of Mannerheim, he urged that Mannerheim supply an
answer, at least "in principle," to the request upon the next day.''? Mannerheim
telephoned Ryti that night and received permission to accept the proposed trans¬
it. Following the Ryti conversation, he called Walden and reported all that had
1ft
transpired. Then the Field Marshal retired for the night, presumably well
pleased v/ith the course of events.
On the morning of 19 August Veltjens had his answer. He telegraphed Goring
of the success of his mission; the AA was alerted.^ Veltjens delayed his depar-
PO
ture in order to confer with Ryti, Witting and Walden. During the meetings
xtfith Ryti and Witting, the course of Finnish-Soviet relations and the Petsamo
P1
nickle negotiations were discussed. The meeting with Walden, on 20 August, was
more specific. It was agreed that the firms of J. Veltjens V/affen und Munition
and Dahberg and Hilbert would serve as intermediaries for the actual transfer of
arms.^ Veltjens assured Walden that expenses incurred during the OKL transit
could be covered by Germany through arms deliveries. The Finnish government of¬
fered to put tonnage at Germany's disposal for the Baltic leg of the transit.
Veltjens told the Minister that large numbers of land mines could be obtained by
Finland on credit. Finally, Veltjens passed on Goring's "personal opinion" that
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Finland should prepare to defend itself; "Russia's goal in a new war could only
be to annihilate Finland.
In Berlin, Schnurre, Kivimaki and Rainer von Fieandt, head of the Finnish
el
delegation involved in the nick±« negotiations, were summoned by von Ribben-
trop. The RAM confirmed the rumors that the Fuhrer had decided to release to
Finland the cargo of artillery which had been confiscated in April. The ship¬
ment originally consisted of a mixture of outdated French artillery pieces.^
Von Ribbentrop hastened to add that the Reich was willing to substitute appropri¬
ate weapons from OKW stocks if the Finnish government should so desire. He then
e p(C
commissioned Schnurre to liaises with the OKW on this matter.
Remaining in Berlin, on 22 August Colonel Rossing conferred with Haider.^
Rossing reviewed the state of the Finnish military, reporting that some sixteen
divisions had been raised, the losses of the Winter War having been replaced and,
pO
indeed, that the Army had expanded. Rossing, at some point, would have noted
the material shortages that the Finnish Army suffered from. Haider then informed
the Military Attache that the Fuhrer had authorised the delivery of arms and mu¬
nitions to Finland. He also informed Rossing, who was undoubtably aware of the
fact anyway, that the Fuhrer had ordered the movement of sections of the Gebirgs-
korps to Kirkenes.^9 Rossing departed, to inform von Blucher in detail upon his
return to the DGH.
Immediately upon Veltjens' departure from Helsinki, Mannerheim appointed
three officers - Major General Paavo Talvela, Colonel M.K. Stewen, and Commodore
Svante A. Sundman of the Finnish Navy - to study the transit proposal and develop
details for the formal arrangement. They were to be directly answerable only to
the Field Marshal.On 29 August, Talvela, responsible for all traffic on the
Arctic Highway north of Rovaniemi, and Stewen, Chief of Operations of the Finnish
General Staff, departed Helsinki with naval and military maps to travel to Ber¬
lin. There they entered into discussions with representatives of the OKL and
OCT.
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Meanwhile, on 22 August, Colonel Raatikainen was ordered to Berlin with a
list of arms that Finland desired.^ Throughout the latter half of August, con¬
ferences on the arms transaction were taking place. On 2k August, Thomas, fol¬
lowing a meeting with Goring, wrote "The Reich Marshal said to me that he had
directed the Air Ministry to make deliveries as liberally as possible. Speedy
assistance to Finland is essential, especially because Finland is ready to make
concessions in every respect. The business should be completed quickly in close
cooperation with Velt,jens."53 On 26 August von Brauchitsch met with Hitler and
reviewed the progress of the transit and arms negotiations.-^ On 30 August, fol¬
lowing yet another conference with Goring on 29 August, Thomas was permitted to
brief the staff officers of WiRu on the new Reich policy with regard to Fin¬
land. 55 Study commenced in the offices of the WiRu on the best methods to speed¬
ily supply Finland's military necessities.
A curious dichotomy appears at this point. Thomas of OKW wrote on 30 Au¬
gust , "Any further political or military advance of the Russians in the European
area would be displeasing to the Fuhrer. He has given a directive that support
of Finland be carried out immediately on a very extensive scale. The fact that
Germany is giving assistance to Finland is to be made known to the Russians,
since the Fuhrer believes that then the Russians will shrink from further steps.
On the other hand, Haider of OKH noted on 31 August, "The Russians should under¬
stand ... That the transports at present going to Finland are only shipments of
arms which were withheld during the war and which can now be made (instead of
guns of large caliber which can be used by Germany, these are of medium caliber)
... Reinforcement of Kirkenes. For this purpose transit through Finland. This
is directed against England."37 While the OKW foresaw the transit and arms
agreements as a counter and a warning to the Soviet Union; the OKH engaged in a
feeble attempt at camouflage for the shift in German policy. This was but the
first such difference in method and in interpretation that was to confuse and
complicate all approaches to a unified policy, both diplomatic and military, in
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relations with Finland and with Soviet Russia. The increasing rivalry between
the OKW and the OKH, coupled with the ignorance of the AA, was to bedevil German
strategy in Finland.-^®
On 19 August WiRu OKW submitted a two page memorandum entitled "Bedeutung
Finnlands fur die deutsche Wehrwirtschaft" to Keitel; in effect it was a compre¬
hensive study of Finland's economic significance. Six categories of commodities
of use to the German war economy were enumerated; the first dealt with the
el
nickle available from the Kolosjoki mines. The study left no room for doubt: "As
a source country for German supplies, Finland is indispensable with regard to
e(
nickle.On 20 August this memorandum was forwarded to Colonel Buschenhagen
under a letter from Warlimont, who wrote that the study "confirms the decisive
importance of the Petsamo area and suggests ... that all measures should be
taken in order to appear there first ... and to secure the deposits for Germany
under all circumstances."^® By 22 August Buschenhagen and Falkenhorst had read
and initialed the memorandum. Buschenhagen's staff had begun operational studies
immediately in response to the WiRu report. By 23 August three papers had been
drafted for the perusal of OKW. The first was a geopolitical treatise on pos-
sible Soviet operations against northern Norway. ' The next concerned a number
of supply and transit problems for the defense of the Kirkenes region which were
to be passed on to Dietl. The last, the most significant, was a brief draft for
l±p
an armed German occupation of Petsamo, codenamed "Renntier." Buschenhagen was
charged with the responsibility of expanding in detail the Renntier plan. On 26
August the concept of seizing the Petsamo region was discussed with the OKH
chiefs. Haider noted that this possible venture was yet another demand on Ger¬
many's overstretched resources, but the planning was to be continued.^ Haider
i,i i
also noted that the occupation could be triggered by a Soviet attack on Finland.
Haider undoubtedly gained this information from von Brauchitsch, who had confer¬
red with Hitler that day; however, this did not mean that Hitler had decided to
openly support Finland in the event of a general Finnish-Soviet war. Yet the
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Reich was now willing to risk a confrontation over the fate of Petsamo if neces¬
sary. Renntier was the first of several feasibility studies to be initiated con¬
cerning OKW/OKH operations on Finnish soil.^
On 3 September Lieutenant General Friedrich Paulus took up the appointment
of Quartermaster General OKH. Personnel under his direction began immediate work
on a strategic survey for operations in the east based on the Marcks Plan.^
Jodl had meanwhile requested his subordinates in the AL to prepare a campaign
plan for his consideration. This operational study was to be drafted without re¬
course to the plans that were being prepared by the OKH, since Jodl wanted to
l±n
evaluate the OKH planning prior to its submission to Hitler. ' The AL plan, sub¬
mitted to Jodl on 19 September, stressed the need for concentrating the assault
forces north of the shortest route to Moscow, via Smolensk. In the Finnish thea¬
ter of operations the AL officers advised the concentration of all available Ger¬
man and Finnish forces in the south; no attack in the direction of Murmansk was
contemplated. The thrust across the southeastern border was to be coordinated
with the advance of Army Group North and was to be directed across the Karelian
^ ^ LR
Isthmus towards Leningrad or east of Lake La^otjEa towards Tikhvin. The inten¬
tion was to assist the advance of Army Group North by isolating and destroying
Soviet forces that could threaten the northern flank. The plan possessed the ad¬
vantage of tying the operations out of Finland directly in with the main German
effort, obeying Clausewitz's maxim on concentration of forces. But, the AL plan
was impaired by political and transportation difficulties which would prevent
Wehrmacht concentration in southern Finland prior to the attack.
Through early September Talvela and Stewen, together with Major Ochs for
Germany, labored to draft the military version of the transit agreement.5® On 3
September Talvela and Ochs arrived in Helsinki to survey the north region of the
transit, notably the Arctic Highway through Petsamo. Finally, an agreement was
signed in Helsinki by Stewen and Ochs and dated 12 September.^1 The initial
"military" transit agreement was in the form of a working arrangement between the
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Finnish General Staff and the OKL. It did not refer to any aspect of possible
political or legal complications; it dealt entirely with the technical details of
the transits. There were to be three transits, carrying OKL personnel and flak
equipment to the Finnish-Norwegian border on the Arctic Highway route; the first
would travel in Finnish shipping from German harbors on 18 September and debark
for transit on 22 September. The other two would follow at specified intervals
with the entire south to north shift to be concluded by 16 October.5^ The three
mass transits were to consist of two thousand three hundred thirty-nine troops
and two hundred and seven vehicles in the first movement, two thousand five hun¬
dred and one men and three hundred eighty vehicles in the second, and six hundred
ninty-eight men and one hundred twenty-three vehicles in the final transit.
Heinrichs noted that the agreement stipulated that the troops and their arms were
to travel apart.55 The troops were to be landed at Oulu, the war materials and
vehicles at Vaasa.5^ The Germans were to be conveyed to Rovaniemi in sealed
trains, would then move overland to Ivalo and, after a rest, eventually to Kir-
kenes. Provisions were made permitting the Reich to establish depots along the
route, barracks at Rovaniemi and an extensive supply dump at Ivalo.55 Some one
thousand one hundred and two OKL personnel were to man the transit route, supply
dumps and rest camps. These were to retire at the conclusion of the operation.^
During the course of the negotiations, the German representative extended the
possibility that the transit become permanent, as in the case of Sweden, for men
on leave or ill.57 The terms of the agreement were sufficiently vague to permit
great latitude in the details of execution.5^
On the same day that von Ribbentrop was being briefed by the OKH on aspects
"of a technical nature" of the military contact with Finland, y Lieutenant Colo¬
nel Bernhard von Lossberg submitted to the OKW Operations Study "Ost, W.F.St./Op.
H. 905" dated 15 September. The Lossberg study was an informal treatise on pro¬
jected operations for the army groups assigned to the invasion of Russia. In it
is mentioned Gr.XXI, which would be under the command of AOK Norwegen and operate
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from Finnish soil. Lossberg's report states, "Group XXI will form a separate
group in the north, together with the army of the Finns, who it is anticipated
will be our allies. It will have the task of striking with part of its forces
from north-eastern Norway towards Murmansk. The main body of its forces will
move on Swedish and Finnish railways and under Finnish protection to southern
Finland, where it will pin down Russian forces and perhaps attack north of Lake
Laj|o<|a, at the latest when the German north wing is approaching Leningrad."^0
This is the kernel of the planning that would later be used as a basis for ini¬
tial negotiations with the Finnish High Command on joint operations. Gr.XXI was
rapidly being elevated from the status of a paper army. The 196th Infantry Di-
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vision was shifted to Norway in September and designated for use in Finland.
Between 17 August and 25 September some twelve thousand six hundred troops of the
Gebirgskorps, supplemented by one thousand one hundred eighty-four horses, one
thousand four hundred eighty-four vehicles, and fifteen panzers stood along the
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Finnish border. ~ And in early September Hitler authorized the establishment of
a OKM command for the polar coast.^
The leaders of the Finnish government, perhaps prompted by Kivimaki, became
concerned after 12 September that the military transit agreement was insuffi¬
cient. On 20 September Kivimaki raised the matter with von Grundherr of the AA,
who was stunned to hear that OKL troops would land in Finland on 22 September.
Von Weizsacker, contacted by telephone, professed ignorance of this development.
Kivimaki declared that his government was concerned with appearances and thus
wished a political agreement to cover the transit. State Secretary von Weiz¬
sacker drafted such an agreement, but on 21 September informed Kivimaki that the
matter really did not merit concern or attention. Kivimaki reported to Witting
in Helsinki that the AA seemed unwilling to commit the matter to writing. Later
Kivimaki was shown a draft by Grundherr and finally, on 22 September, von Weiz¬
sacker and Kivimaki formalized the transit by an exchange of diplomatic notes, a
few hours after the landing of the first bloc of German troops. ' The political
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transit agreement read:
"1. The Finnish Government, upon request of the Government of the Reich,
grants the through-transport of material with escort personnel from the northern
ports of the Baltic Sea by way of Rovaniemi and the northern Arctic Ocean Road to
Kirkenes in Northern Norway.
"2, The Government of the German Reich shall duly indicate to the Finnish
Government the ports of debarkation selected, the number of the transport ves-
sals, the dates of sailing and arrival, and the scheduled daily stages of the
transports in Northern Finland.
"3. The Government of the Reich shall notify the Finnish Government at
least one day in advance of the arrival of the transport vessels.
"k. Ordnance shall be shipped apart from the troops in seperate freight
cars. A special agreement will be made regarding the number of officers and men
for the guard details on the freight cars carrying ordnance."^
It is obvious that the political transit agreement was less specific than the
military transit agreement. The reason for the diplomatic note would appear to
arise from the Finnish desire for a legalistic approach and, very probably, the
Finnish desire to publicly proclaim an end to Finland's enforced isolation, the
creation of an entente cordiale.^
The first sailing consisted of six transport ships with an accompanying
tanker which put to sea in convoy from Swinemunde and Stettin on 20 September and
21 September.^ This convoy arrived off the ports of Waskiluoto (Vaasa) and Oulu
during the early hours of 22 September. Civilian officials were unaware of the
transit arrangements; the chief of police in Vaasa telephoned the Ministry of the
Interior and announced that German troop transports were standing off the port;
he requested instructions. The Minister of the Interior knew nothing of the mat¬
ter and in turn contacted Ryti. Ryti assured him that the landings had been pre-
ro
pared for; the assurances passed down the line; the troops landed. Thus began
the transit of Wehrmacht troops through Finland, a sight that was to grow famil-
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lar within the next few months.
Once the transit had begun, it became necessary, since obviously any attempt
at concealment would have been futile and possibly contrary to Finnish aspira¬
tions, to inform foreign governments with diplomatic missions in Finland, notably
the Stalin and the Churchill governments, which recently had been causing the
Finnish leaders some concern.^ As early as 12 September, during a conversation
between an anonymous German officer and the Chief of Finnish Intelligence, one
Colonel Melander, in Stockholm, the Finns requested that the Reich inform the So¬
viet Union of the transit.^7"' On 16 September Ambassador von Schulenburg in Mos¬
cow was instructed to inform the Soviets, "verbally and casually," on the after¬
noon of 21 September that the Finnish government had granted transit to an OKL
antiaircraft battalion bound for Kirkenes.^ On 21 September 19^0, Lieutenant
Colonel Leopold Burkner notified AOK Norwegen that the AA would inform the Sovi-
et Union of the transit. Von Schulenburg, however, left Moscow for Berlin on
nL
the morning of 21 September, evidently without carrying out his instructions.'
There followed a brief confusing flurry of communications on who should inform
who, typical of the diplomacy of the time. Weizsacker wrote on 22 September that
"the Finnish Government also suggested that we inform the Russian Government on
the date of arrival of the ships in Finland, or directly prior to that date.
However, we intend to refrain from doing so. The Finnish Minister here jj3erlinJ
considers it proper for the Finnish Government on its part to inform the Russian
Government as a precautionary measure, whereas the Finnish Foreign Minister does
not want to inform the Russians on his own initiative for the time being, but on¬
ly in case of a Russian inquiry. However, we are not exerting any influence on
this decision to be taken by the Finnish Government."^ Von Blucher, the next
day, informed the AA that Witting had informed the British and Soviet ambassadors
in Helsinki of the political transit agreement. While the English representative
received the news calmly and left to draft a formal protest, the Soviet minister
was serious and probing.^ The Soviet envoy even inquired if Germany had issued
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an ultimatum to gain the transit rights.On 26 September, Vyacheslav M. Molo-
tov met with Werner von Tippleskirch, since von Schulenburg was still absent, and
requested the text of the Finnish-German agreement, including all secret provi¬
sions. Citing an official German communique by Paul Karl Schmidt of the press
section of the AA, Molotov became insistent. Von Tippteskirch professed total
ignorance of the matter and promised to communicate with Berlin.7®
During the 12 September conversation between Melander and the German offi¬
cial, the Finnish officer made several noteworthy requests on behalf of his na¬
tion. First, the Reich was to grant Sweden a free hand to aid Finland if a So¬
viet invasion was launched. Second, OKW artillery and armor specialists were to
be sent to Finland for consultation. Finally, Melander listed arms that Finland
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desired, 15-cm artillery and 3.7 PAK and 20-mm flak.'7
As noted earlier, Raatikainen had arrived on a secret mission to officially
negotiate for arms. The arms that had been confiscated in the Norwegian ports
were deemed unsuitable and the OKW agreed that they would be replaced by captured
British and French material and arms of German manufacture. Further, it was a-
greed that the munitions destined for Finland would comprise three hundred pieces
of mixed artillery, five hundred pieces of antiaircraft artillery, five thousand
revolvers, fifty-three aircraft, some six hundred fifty thousand shells of vari¬
ous calibre, four hundred thousand antiaircraft shells, and one hundred fifty
thousand antitank mines. A scheme was devised whereby the arms would journey to
Finland with the transit troops but be loaded into separate railroad cars and be
Or\
detached along the route. On 30 September Veltjens arrived in Helsinki to fi-
nalize negotiations. On 1 October the Finnish alloted the Ministry of
Defense fifteen hundred million Finnmarks to purchase arms. By agreement the
Reich owed Finland seven million six hundred ninty-six Reichsmarks and eighty-six
81
Pfennigs compensation for transit and the confiscated Madsen shipment. Fin¬
land's credit, for the arms contract, was excellent. On 1 October the contract
Op
was signed by Walden and Veltjens. Although the actual arms passed between the
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firms of O.Y. Dahberg and Hilbert A.B. of Helsinki and J. Veltjens Waffen und
Munition of Berlin, the arms in effect went from the stocks of the OKW to those
of the Finnish Army. The contract was envisioned to last till October 19^5•^
The August-October period can be considered, arbitrarily, the first phase of
the development of German military strategy in Finland. From the moment consid¬
eration and study of a possible attack on the Soviet Union began, overall German
policy towards Finland altered: and at no other period was the reversal of policy
so obviously dramatic as during this first phase. The strengthening of the Fin¬
nish Army with arms and munitions had begun. The establishment of a large force
in Finnmark was being carried out by way of conventional transit through Norway
and via the special Finnish rail-highway link. This was already designated by
the OKW to be a sufficiently powerful force to be used for independent offensive
action. Indeed, plans for its use were already being formulated; witness Remi¬
tter. AA support for the Finnish position on diplomatic issues, though hesitent,
was becoming manifest. The trips of Talvela, Stewen and Raatikainen to Berlin
and of Ochs to Finland planted the germ of future staff cooperation between the
German High Command and the Finnish High Command. And, of great consequence,
tentative suggestions for use of German and Finnish forces operating, from Fin¬
nish territory, against the Red Army had been made by OKW and OKH staff planners.
The Finnish military, unaitfare of all the facets, did not - could not - perceive
the pattern of development; the Wehrmacht strategists could, with only slightly
more vision, recognize portents of the future. German military presence in Fin¬
land's existence was to be increasingly concrete and increasingly purposeful.
That it existed at all was due to these initial events, all interlocking.
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Second Phase: October 19^0 - December 19^+0
"The race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong, but
A
that's the way to bet." - Anonymous.
"What can Finland hope for? America is far away - too far. And Bolshevism
2
is close at hand - too close." - attributed to Heinrich Himmler.
On 2 October, von Ribbentrop authorized von Tipp^bskirch to affirm that OKL
troops were traveling to Kirkenes via a Finnish land route. Von Tippi^skirch was
to stress its non-political naturae and declare that, as the matter was purely
technical, the German Reich had seen no compelling reason to expressly inform the
Soviet Union of the matter.^ The agreement was to be likened to the Swedish-Ger¬
man transit agreement;^ "just as we |Germany] reached an understanding with Swe¬
den about similar transport through Swedish territory to the areas of Oslo,
Trondheim, and Narvik, an understanding was reached with Finland about transit to
the area of Kirkenes.Von Tipp\,eskirch was authorized to deliver to Molotov
the text of the 22 September four-point political agreement.^ Von Tipp^skirch
carried out his instructions during a conversation with the Soviet Foreign Minis¬
ter at the Kremlin on A October. Molotov repeatedly pointed out that Finland
fell, by agreement, within the Soviet sphere of influence.7 He then requested
that more detailed information regarding the transits be supplied by the Reich,
specifically mentioning as points of interest numbers involved, their exact des¬
tinations, and the duration of the transit.0 Von Tippleskirch desired to know
whether the Soviet government had not also been informed by the Finnish govern¬
ment of the transit; Molotov replied in the negative. The Minister Attache could
do no more than communicate Molotov's request for yet more information to the
Wilhelmstrasse, which he promised to do.9
On 7 October the Finnish government received a note from Ivan S. Zotov, the
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Soviet Minister in Helsinki, demanding free access for Soviet observers to the
German transit route and Finnish military installations along the route.''® This
action emphasised forcibly the danger for Finland inherent in the transit agree¬
ment. Finnish leaders had concluded it for the sole purpose of aligning German
interests more closely with the interests of Finland, so closely that the Reich
might be inclined to defend those interests against Soviet pressure. Should this
hope prove to be illusory, then the Finns would have succeeded only in provoking
the Soviet government and, in granting the transit request, might well have ven¬
tured beyond the bounds of safety. They had, irrevocably, decided to gamble on
German support, as implied by the arms contract. The Finns hoped to turn this
implication into a steadfast quarantee. In a letter to Veltjens, Witting ex¬
pressed the hope that the Reich "in case of possible difficulties which might
arise' for the Finnish state from the Soviet Union as a result of fulfilling the
1 "1
terms of the contract, would lend its support in eliminating such difficulties."
Finland, floundering in the morass, had yet to find a rock to ciing to.''®
Rossing and his staff in Helsinki had been requested to gather information
for Buschenhagen's Renntier planning. In early October Rossing drew attention to
the complete lack of Finnish preparation for the defense of the Petsamo region in
any future Soviet-Finnish conflict. No military construction was in progress
there; existing trenches and barbed wire obstacles were neglected and deteriorat¬
ing. The Military Attache summed up his estimate of Finland's operational inten¬
tions in the far north as, "Surrender of the territory north of Rovaniemi-Kemi-
jarvi. Attempt to maintain land bridge with Sweden."''3 Von Falkenhorst, too,
was seeking information for the Renntier project, requesting specific military
and economic details directly from the Finnish government. His requests were
considered, in a meeting under the direction of Ryti, by the Finnish cabinet on
23 October. The possibility that the OKW might pass on such information to the
A 11
Soviets was of grave concern, but the requests were partially fulfilled.
Even as the planning for a possible campaign in the east was developing, the
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OKW launched, in October, a major program for the development of adequate road
and rail facilities in eastern and northern Europe in anticipation of the heavy-
military traffic necessitated by any invasion. Codenamed "Otto", the program
saw the shift of rail-construction troops, snow-removal equipment, and ferry
boats to Finnmark.^ For the air defense of the Arctic area, FBK Kirkenes was
established.^ The troop buildup in north Norway continued apace. On 19 October
Jodl informed the AA that an infantry division would be soon bound for Finnmark
via Norway and that the OKL transit was complete, some four thousand eight hun¬
dred troops with five hundred eighty-seven vehicles having passed through Fin¬
land.^ Buschenhagen exhibited some concern over the shift of the 196th Division
along the Norwegian coast to Finnmark; on 28 October he requested extra troop
transports for the movement and asked for additional OKH and OKL defensive
cover.^9 On 29 October Buschenhagen's request was again noted; he expressed con¬
siderable apprehension over possible enemy strikes at the six thousand troops
?o
while at sea.
On 22 October, the new head of Op.Abt. OKW, Colonel Heusinger, reorganized
the department in preparation for projected eastern operations. "Gr. I" was to be
concerned with eastern Europe and section "I-Nord" under Captain Brandt was as¬
signed responsibility for "operations of strategy in the north-eastern theater,"
comprising north Russia, Finland, Sweden Norway, and sections of Poland.AOK
Norwegen and AG Nord would come under the command of "I-Nord."
On 29 October, the Op.Abt. OKH submitted a completed strategic survey to
Haider. In the study the officers formalized their views regarding the most ap¬
propriate strategy for an eastern campaign. The study noted the Russo-German
strength ratio, problems inherent in the vast terrain, limitations of time, cur¬
rent intelligence, and an analysis of objectives. The survey concluded that the
main effort should be concentrated north of the Pripyet Marshes with the princi-
al thrust directed via Smolensk towards Moscow. Factors for this analysis includ¬
ed the disposition of only thirty Red Army divisions in the Baltic States, the
superior transportation network, logistic considerations, and possible diversion-
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ary strikes by Finnish-German forces. Even among the lesser staff officers, it
would seem, the assumption of Finnish cooperation with the invading forces was
automatic.
During November the OKH was diverted from planning for the invasion of the
Soviet Union by preparations for a potential armed intervention in the Balkans.
However, this diversion did not affect the training and equipping of the newly
activated front-line divisions which was under way.^3 of some concern to the OKH
leadership, notably Haider and Paulus, was the increasing unease of the Soviet
Union. On 2 November, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign
Trade, complained to Schnurre that while the Reich was not willing to deliver war
material to the Red Army, it was supplying arms and equipment to Finland. This
was the first hint that Soviet officialdom was aware of the arms contract, a mat¬
ter both the AA and the WiRu had hoped to keep secret.^ Soviet pressure on Fin¬
land in relation to the Petsamo negotiations increased significantly; von Schulen-
burg theorized on 1 November that "the Soviet interest in the Petsamo region is
purely political, especially in view of the proximity of the sole icefree port of
Murmansk."^ And in November came the first Soviet inquiries, directed at General
Koestring, Military Attache in the DGM, on troop concentrations in former Polish
and Norwegian provinces. Koestring replied, as ordered, that the troop movements
were incidental to redeployment following the conclusion of the campaign in the
west and the requirements of military occupation of Norway and Poland.
Troubled by the gradual divergence of Soviet and Nazi interests, von Ribben-
trop wished to initiate a high-level conference with the Soviet leadership. Hit¬
ler was less than enthusiastic. As von Ribbentrop later wrote, "First I wanted
to bring about a Stalin-Hitler meeting, but this came to nothing because Hitler
said that Stalin could not leave Russia and he could not leave Germany. Then I
wrote a long letter to Stalin ... and invited Molotov to Berlin.Von Schu-
lenburg returned to his post at the DGM on 17 October, carrying von Ribbentrop's
pO
letter. ° The Soviet government displayed no hesitation in accepting; it was
agreed that Molotov would arrive in Berlin for talks on 12 November. Hitler had
few illusions; on 12 November, the very day Molotov arrived, he informed the mil¬
itary in Directive Eighteen that "Political discussions have been initiated with
the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the
results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have been ver¬
bally ordered will be continued. Instructions on this will follow as soon as the
general outlines of the Army's operational plans have been submitted to me and
received my approval."^9 Thus, with von Ribbentrop hopeful and Hitler pessimis¬
tic, did Molotov arrive for the conferences.
The first meeting with Molotov served only to bolster Hitler's pessimism and
deflate von Ribbentrop's hopes. One of the first topics to arise, and one of the
most volatile, was the German position vis-a-vis Finland. Molotov stated that
"the German-Russian agreement of last year could be regarded as fulfilled, except
for one point, namely, Finland."^® He inquired of the Fuhrer as to whether, in
the view of the Reich, the German-Russian agreement of 1939? so far as it concern¬
ed Finland, was still in force. Molotov stated that the issue of Finland "could
be solved without war, but there must be neither German troops in Finland nor
political demonstrations ... against the Soviet Russian government."^ Further,
the Soviets viewed as political demonstrations "the dispatch of Finnish delega¬
tions to Germany or reception of prominent Finns in Germany."^ Indeed, in the
opinion of the Soviet government, the Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Pact represent¬
ed but a partial solution to the Finnish situation.^ Pressing, Molotov then
declared that "the Soviet government would like to know, too, why German forces
had been sent to Finland. And why had this serious step also been taken without
consultation with Moscow?"^ In response, Hitler pleaded lack of information and
pretended not to know there were any German troops in Finland. "A conflict in
the Baltic Sea area," he said vaguely, "would complicate German-Soviet rela¬
tions. "35 "But the Soviet Union is not preparing to disrupt the peace in this
region and is in no way threatening Finland," Molotov objected, "we are concerned
with ensuring peace and genuine security in that region. The German government
should take this fact into account if it is interested in the normal development
of Soviet-German relations."5° Hitler allowed the topic to lapse and passed on
to conflicts of interest in the Balkans.
Molotov's visit to Berlin in November obviously unsettled the Finnish govern¬
ment, who feared a detente developing between the two giants. On 12 November
Edvin Lundstrom, the Counselor of the Finnish Berlin Legation, called on Woermann
and on Grundherr, handing them duplicate notes.5? "The Finnish Legation assumes
that political conversations regarding continental Europe are under way at the
present time. In case these conversations also affect Finland, Finland would
appreciate it if Germany could strengthen Finland's position in the course of
them. At the same time the Finnish Legation wanted to give assurance that Fin¬
land was on the one hand eager to strengthen and deepen the relations with Ger¬
many and on the other wanted nothing else in connection with Russia but to be able
to live and work in peace within the area belonging to her after the last peace
treaty."58 Long after the conference, the Finnish government still displayed some
apprehension in regard to the recent Soviet-Nazi talks and the Reich acted to
allay these. On 18 November von Weizsacker recorded that Kivirnaki had visited
his office in regard to rumors which were circulating in Berlin's diplomatic com¬
munity to the effect that the Molotov visit had had "serious consequenses for Fin¬
land." Von Weizsacker assured him that nothing had transpired during the visit,
as far as he knew, which could justify these rumors.59 On the same day, von
Blucher met with Witting to report on the Molotov-Hitler convetsations. Von
Blucher declared that Soviet Russia now understood that Germany did not wish
complications in the north, that peace had to be maintained, that German-Finnish
friendship was strong, and that Finland had nothing to fear.^® At the Wilhelm-
strasse, von Blucher had been told by von Weizsacker that Finland was safe; Hit-
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ler had held "his umbrella firmly over Finland."
Molotov returned to the Finnish issue during his final meeting with Hitler
on 13 November. "The Soviet government insisted on being informed of the true
aims behind the sending of German troops into a country immediately bordering on
such a prominent industrial and cultural center as Leningrad. What was the mean¬
ing of this occupation of Finland by German troops? According to information in
Soviet possession, these troops were not preparing to move into Norway; on the
contrary, they were fortifying their position along the Soviet border. Therefore,
the Soviet government insisted on the immediate evacuation of German troops from
Finland."^ Hitler replied that Germany recognized that, "politically", Finland
was of primary interest to the Soviet Union. However, two points were crucial in
regard to Finland: "1. For the duration of the war Germany was greatly interested
in the deliveries of nickijj/§ and lumber from Finland; and 2. Germany did not desire
any new conflict in the Baltic Sea which would further curtail her freedom of
movement. It was completely incorrect to assert that Finland was occupied by Ger¬
man troops. Troops were being transported to Kirkenes via Finland, of which fact
Russia had been officially informed. However, as soon as the transit of troop
contingents to be sent had been completed, no additional troops would be sent
through Finland.Hitler, obviously, considered the matter closed. Summariz¬
ing, von Ribbentrop declared that "the Fuhrer had declared that Finland remained
in the sphere of influence of Russia and that Germany would not maintain any
troops there; Germany had nothing to do with demonstrations of Finland against
Russia, but was exerting her influence in the opposite direction; and the collab¬
oration of the two countries was the decisive problem of long-range importance,
which in the past had already resulted in great advantages for Russia. There was
actually no reason at all for making an issue of the Finnish question. Strategi¬
cally, all of Russia's wishes had been satisfied by her peace treaty with Fin¬
land."^
Thus Molotov departed for Moscow, never to return. Von Ribbentrop, desper¬
ately disappointed, later wrote, "Molotov's visit to Berlin did not take place
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under as lucky a star as I had hoped for. He made a very strong demand for a
free hand in Finland. Hitler had not briefed me on his attitude to the Finnish
question, in which right was undoubtably on Molotov's side. But the Fuhrer did
not want to give up Finland and probably also believed that he could not do with¬
out Finnish nick|/&. Our discussion Hitler-Molotov became fairly stubborn ..."^
Goring wrote, of a conversation with Hitler following Molotov's departure, that
the Fuhrer told him, "I can't let Russia attack Finland anew and square it with
the German people. If Russia has all of Finland, we shall be outflanked on the
north, ... and the first thing we know she'll be in Narvik."^ And perhaps the
final word on the Hitler-Molotov conference was made by Haider, who wrote on 16
November that any further Soviet move against Finland "would constitute a casus
belli for Germany." ?
Even as Molotov was objecting to the presence of German troops in Finland to
Hitler, on 13 November Reiner Kreutzwald, who was in Berlin, informed the OKW that
Witting would approve an extension of the now defunct transit agreement to cover
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a north-south transit of Finland by military personnel based in Finnmark. ° The
OKW wished to keep the line open, as a secure transport and supply system. On 19
November a committee of Finnish officers, headed by Colonel Stewen and Colonel
Paasonen, and German officers, headed by Colonel Rossing and Captain Berling,
convened to reach a military agreement on this transit extension.^ By 22 Novem¬
ber, both sides were satisfied and a draft military agreement was signed. The
details were simple. German personnel, on furlough or extended sick leave, were
permitted to travel via the Finnish rail and road system. The port of entry and
exit was Turku, being the only harbor open for the winter transit.1'® German
troops travelling in both directions were never to exceed the number of seven
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hundred fifty.^ The OKW was to construct accomodations for five hundred men at
Rovaniemi, Sodankyla, and Ivalo.^- Depots were to be established at Pori and
Rauma and an OKW representative installed at Turku.53 The two-way transit was to
be initiated on 9 December,^ A pre-arranged exchange of diplomatic notes took
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place on 21 November to provide the agreement with the political cover the Finns
were so concerned about. The note read briefly, "Referring to the discussions
and the exchange of notes in Berlin on 22.9.^+0 ... has the honor to declare that
the transits of leavemen on the route Kirkenes-Rovaniemi-Turku and in the opposite
direction are now to begin."55
On 23 November, Veltjens, again in a semi-official capacity, arrived in Hel¬
sinki. 5^ Veltjens confined his talks to the military leaders, chiefly to Manner-
57heim.^' He reported the course of the Molotov-Hitler conferences, and delivered
Goring's opinions on the Petsamo situation. He was informed that the Finnish
president, Kyosti Kallio, was to resign shortly due to ill health.58 ge was sup¬
plied with intelligence reports on the damage inflicted by OKL air raids on Lon¬
don, prepared by the Finnish military attache there, for Goring.59 yet all of
this was secondary to his mission, to complete the final deliveries of arms and
evaluate the Finnish military position. The last arms shipment was to arrive on
10 December. When the Finnish authorities expressed the desire to continue the
deliveries, Veltjens agreed to present their views to the WiRu. Veltjens drafted
a recommendation to establish a second arms supply program along the lines the
Finns desired, stressing the need for artillery and aircraft.^ Veltjens departed
for Berlin on 26 November.
Throughout November and December the German military establishment was en¬
gaged in numerous organizational matters, improving its positions in the Arctic
North. Winter clothing, including skis and anoraks, were issued to the troops of
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the Gebirgskorps. The four hundred fifty bed hospital ship "Stuttgart" was
stationed in Kirkenes harbor. The Gebirgskorps was rearmed with the new 33/^0
carbines in December.^3 It was agreed that the bulk of the supply of the Gebirgs-
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korps could now be carried out via the Arctic Highway. One hundred eighty OKH
personnel labored through late November and early December to complete the one
hundred fifty barracks, each capable of housing fifty men, along the transit
route through Finland.^5 And by mid-December troops were traveling south along
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the transit via Ivalo, Sodankyla, Rovaniemi, Oulu, then on to^liviesko, Haapa-
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maki, Tampere, and departing Turku for the Fatherland. D The north resonated
with military activity.
The OKH strategic survey was tested in a General Staff exercise conducted by
Paulus. Staff officers responsible for drafting the OKH plan acted as group lead¬
ers. Paulus divided the exercise into three phases: the first began 29 November
with the invasion and the initial battles near the border; the second, commencing
3 December, continued the offensive operations to the Kiev-Minsk-Lake Peipus line;
and the last, staged 7 December, dealt with reaching the final objectives of the
campaign. After each phase Paulus indicated the premises for the start of the
next part of the exercise by explaining the phase line that had been reached, the
condition of the German troops and allied forces, the supply situation, and intel¬
ligence estimates.^ The general conclusion to the exercise was "that the German
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forces were barely sufficient for the purpose." Paulus admitted to Haider that
the final objective, Volga-Archangel, was "far beyond anything the German forces
could hope to achieve."^9 Major General Eduard Wagner prepared logistical exer¬
cises in conjunction with the OKH staff exercise, and completed an OKH logistical
plan as a counterpart to the strategic survey. Thomas of OKW noted in November
19^0, in a report on the economic implications of a campaign in the east, the
shortages of strategic supplies the Wehrmacht and allied forces would face.^O
In early December Hitler requested an OKH briefing on the strategic survey.
On 5 December, during a four hour conference, von Brauchitsch and Haider present¬
ed the OKH plan, despite the fact that it was still the subject of study and modi¬
fication by Paulus.^ In his verbal report, Haider first reviewed the topograph¬
ical features of the theater and noted that most objectives lay in the Ukraine, in
Moscow, and around Leningrad. Total assault forces numbered one hundred and five
infantry divisions and thirty-two panzer and motorized infantry divisions advan¬
cing in three AG.^ Hitler took it for granted that the attack would commence in
the spring of 19^1; when von Brauchitsch pointed out the danger of a two-front
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war, the Fuhrer declared that the inferiority of the Red Army made the present
time "especially favorable" for a Werhmacht offensiveHitler agreed to the
basic plan thus presented; however, he stressed the importance of preventing the
Soviet Army from making a planned withdrawal; Soviet military potential had to be
eliminated and its regeneration made impossible. Therefore, Soviet forces in the
Baltic States had to be isolated and eliminated. In contrast to the OKH studies,
he suggested that the central forces advance north during the envelopment phase
to assist in isolating the Red forces in the Baltic and strike at Leningrad. The
idea of securing the Baltic region prior to further advances involoved a major
departure from the OKH plans, and the military accepted, overtly, the proposal.^
Hitler stated that Finnish forces would participate in this operation; in addi¬
tion, a secondary attack in the far north was to be launched by three German divi¬
sions.^ "To deprive the Baltic fleet of its main base, the Russian war effort of
the armament production of the city and, above all, the Russian Army of a strate¬
gic assembly area for a counter offensive,"^ these were the goals for the mas¬
sive assault on the Baltic area; to this could be added the logistic problems sea
transport over a secure Baltic route would solve.^ Upon resuming his report
Haider pointed out that according to recent data the assembly of forces would
take eight weeks and that OKH preparations could not be concealed from the enemy
after mid-April at the latest.Hitler, at the conclusion of the briefing, gave
official approval to the plan.
The next day Jodl instructed the AL to prepare a directive based on the OKH
strategic survey.On 12 December this draft was submitted to Jodl under the
undistinguished cover name "Fritz".Jodl reviewed the first draft, made a few
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insignificant changes and ordered a revised draft prepared. The chiefs of staff
for each planned AG were ordered to work, without consulting fellow officers, on
problems involved in the campaign; their findings were scrutinized at an OKH head¬
quarters conference on 13 December and 1*f December. A number of their suggestions
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were incorporated into the revised draft. On 16 December Warlimont submitted
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the revised draft to Jodl; and on 17 December Jodl presented the OKW draft direc¬
tive to the Fuhrer for his consideration.^ In sequence, the directive would be
numbered twenty-one, if approved.
Haider met with von Falkenhorst to learn of preparations in the far north.
Dietl, so Haider was informed, could command four divisions from Norway in an
advance into Soviet Russia, these being the 163rd Division (Engelbrecht command¬
ing) , the 199th Division (Kempski), the 2nd Geb.Div. (Feurstein), and the 3rd Geb.
Div. (Kreysing). The two infantry divisions v/ould be moved by the Swedish rail
system to positions in the Salla region of Finland. The armored brigade "SS-Nord"
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would be held as reserve. All were to be in place by 1 April 19^1. AOK Nor-
wegen had a detailed plan for Swedish transit ready for activation.^ Buschen-
hagen, in the December Tatigkeitsbericht, noted that "because of new instructions
... by OKW and OKH, the theoretical preparations for Renntier are being expanded."
Now envisioned was a drive to the White Sea with four divisions launching twin
attacks, one from the Petsamo region and one from the Salla region. "Silber-
fuchs", as the plan came to be codenamed, was at this early stage hampered by
lack of intelligence. Further, on 12 December, Buschenhagen informed Haider that
only one and one half divisions of the Gebirgskorps would be available for the
operation; security for north Norway was essential.^ Thus, even before the
issuance of Directive 21, on the basis of oral instructions given Buschenhagen
and von Falkenhorst, AOK Norwegen understood its mission as a broadening of the
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theoretical Renntier plan.
In anticipation of a spring offensive against the Soviet Union, the OKL
established "Luftgaue Nord Norwegen" at Bardufoss. This air district was assigned
the massive task of preparing airfields and other ground stations in the far
north, including stockpiling supplies at Finnish airfields which might be used by
the Luftwaffe once the offensive was launched. Since a suitable staff for combat
operations was lacking, a tactical command staff was organized as "Luftgaue Kir-
kenes" in mid-December under the direct command of the Fifth Luftflotte. It rap-
idly became apparent that only the airfields at Banak and Kirkenes were suitable
for OKL concentration in northern Norway. Initially "Luftgaue Kirkenes" was
directed to study operational possibilities for establishment of total Luftwaffe
air superiority over the coastal portions of north Norway and Finland, operations
against hostile land and sea forces, operations against the Arctic Canal and Mur¬
mansk and Kandalaksha and Archangel, protection of German and Finnish shipping.®9
The OKM, due to shortages of strategic materials and the massive effort in the
west, after several studies was only able to allocate five U-boats, several mine¬
layers, and a few dozen E-boats to the eastern Baltic.9® Raeder did not express
much optimism over their role in the coming invasion.
On 16 December Lieutenant General Talvela, accompanied by the Finnish mili¬
tary attache in Berlin Colonel Horn, met briefly with Haider.9^ Talvela revealed
that he had, while in Berlin, already visited Goring twice. The meetings were
purely political in nature; they spoke of support for Mannerheim in the upcoming
presidential election,9^ of the Communist threat within Finland, of the Petsamo
negotiations,95 and of the proposed Swedish-Finnish union.9^ These meetings had
been cordial and informal.95 The Talvela meeting with Haider touched on these
same political problems. Talvela did review the military situation in Finland,
noting the problematic defense of the Aaland chain, the Petsamo region, and the
Salla pocket. He reiterated Finland's desire for long-range artillery and combat
aircraft, and further, declared that Sweden could free five divisions for opera¬
tions within Finland, if Germany's attitude towards Sweden were less belliger¬
ent. 9*5 Haider, on his part, requested information regarding the time require¬
ments for an offensive by Finnish forces towards the southeast.97 His probe went
unanswered. Talvela returned to Helsinki within a few days.9®
On 17 December Jodl presented the draft directive to Hitler, who made "a
considerable alteration" with regard to the mission of the two AG committed north
of the Pripyct Marshes.99 Hitler ordered that, as soon as the Soviet forces fac¬
ing AG Centre were broken through, that AG Centre was to transfer considerable
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mobile forces north to aid AG Nord in the annihilation of enemy forces in the
Baltic. He wished to clear Soviet forces from the Baltic in order to "keep it
clear for imports of value to the war effort and because it provided the shortest
line of communication to Finland."''®® Hitler also redesignated "Fritz" by the
term "Barbarossa"On 18 December, after the necessary changes had been incor¬
porated, Hitler signed Directive 21, setting the attack - or rather, the comple¬
tion of all preparations - for 15 May 1941, B-Tag.''®^
Directive 21 outlined three main lines of attack from Finland. Like the
operations on the main front, they were based on what was operationally desirable
rather than what was feasible in view of the logistical problems involved. Fur¬
thermore, they bore little relation to the aims of the Finns. In the far north,
the operation proposed in August had as its aims the German occupation of Petsamo
and later the investment of Murmansk. To the south, an attempt would be made to
sever the Murmansk railway, if Sweden permitted German divisions transit of her
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territory prior to B-Tag. For the Finnish Army, numerous tasks: "Finland will
cover the concentration of the redeployed German North Group (detachments of Group
XXI) and will operate in conjunction with them. Finland will be responsible for
eliminating Hanko." [Section II, paragraph 5«J "It will be the duty of the
main body of the Finnish Army, in conjunction with the advance of the German north
flank, to hold down the strongest possible Russian forces by an attack to the west
of, or on both sides of, Lake La$o<Ja." [Section III, part A.J "Further, Finnish
forces were to take part in the advance on the Murmansk railway."''®^ Whether
Finland was aware of it or not, Directive 21 made it clear that the Reich expected
whole-hearted Finnish cooperation during "Unternehmen Barbarossa".
Shortly before Christmas 1940 Dietl was informed of the aim to attack the
Soviet Union in the spring. His forces, he learned, were to advance beyond Pet¬
samo, directed at Murmansk.^®5 He informed the five staff officers of his com¬
mand, the division commanders, and their adjutants. After a study of the chapter
"Rote Offensivstellung am Eismeer" of the book Russlands Griff urn Nordeurona,
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which passed from hand to hand among these officers, they noted several problems
inherent in any operation against Murmansk. The first was the terrain; the se¬
cond was how to keep the Soviets in doubt of operations prior to the advance it¬
self; the third, and most critical, was the logistic difficulties.
On 31 December Kivimaki met von Weizsacker. "After conveying his New Year's
greetings, the Finnish Minister ... expressed hope for his country. He stated
that in his homeland people were now reassured, because they thought they knew
that in a future conflict with Russia they would not stand alone."''07 Little did
the people of Finland realize that the Reich was preparing the anticipated "fu¬
ture conflict with Russia" even as the new year of war began.
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Third Phase: January 19^1 - May 19^1
"The triangle Finland-Germany-Russia is the figure on which the fate of Fin-
land will be decided." - Wipert von Blucher.
"The more German Soldiers coming into the country, the quieter I lay in my
p
bed at night." - attributed to an anonymous Finnish matron.
By 1 January 19^1 the various German command structures were under no illu¬
sions as to the goal of military strategy in Finland, namely operations against
Soviet territory in the far north as an integral part of the Barbarossa plan.
Two offensive forces were being developed, Gr. XXI in Kirkenes and the Finnish
Army; operational aims for both were being debated in the corridors and offices
of the OKW and the OKH, in Zossen and in Berlin. Sea and air support for these
forces was being organized by the OKM and the OKL. A viable transport/communica-
tions system, with the transit route through Finland an essential component, had
been created to supply their operations. Although countless details remained,
although objectives were not yet finalized, OKW/OKH faced but two major tasks:
the establishment of formal communications directly with the Finnish High Com¬
mand and the coordination of final planning and preparation for B-Tag.
In early January, Veltjens approached the OKV/ to fulfill the promise made in
November 19^+0. On k January Karl Baumann, of the Veltjens firm, arrived in Hel¬
sinki with a list of surplus arms available from the stocks of the OKW which he
presented to Tera. The list had been approved by Thomas of WiRu, and included
rifles, antitank artillery, 155 mm artillery, and corresponding munitions. Fol¬
lowing this overture, General Thomas entered into correspondence with General
Grandell, his counterpart on the Finnish General Staff, concerning specific de¬
tails. In April Raatikainen, accompanied by Tera, toured OKW depots in France
and Germany inspecting and evaluating surplus war material. Thus, one thousand
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rifles, fifty 37mm antitank guns, twenty-four 75mm antiaircraft guns, and twenty
155mm heavy artillery pieces were selected and agreed upon. In early May 19^+1, a
second arms contract - Vertrag 1188 - for direct delivery was signed by represen¬
tatives of J. Veltjens Waffen und Munition and O.Y, Dahberg and Hilbert A.B. The
arms were to arrive in Finland in June and would be paid for with proceeds of the
German furlough transit.-^
Rossing had been continuing his accumulation of data for AOK Norwegen. On 7
January he engaged General Aksel F. Airo, the Finnish quartermaster-general, on
the topic of the Petsamo defenses./+ The Petsamo region was definitely "not of
any Finnish military interest," stated Airo. Since the Finnish Army did not have
available sufficient reserves to defend the entire eastern border, the Petsamo
region was to be abandoned without contest should Soviet forces incroach. The
port facilities at Liinahamari and key bridges along the Arctic Highway were tar¬
geted for demolition and Finnish forces were to retreat southwestwards. Airo was
reticent about, or ignorant of, any Finnish plans to blow the nickijj^ works at Ko-
losjoki.^ The information supplied by Rossing must have been regarded in Berlin
as affirmation of the necessity of Renntier being carried out, whether the German
Reich or the Soviet Union struck first.
On 16 January von Falkenhorst was in Berlin, meeting there with operations
officers of the OKH and the OKW. His conference with Haider was brief, but de¬
cisive. After a review of measures instituted to provide for the defense of the
coast of Norway, von Falkenhorst was ordered by the OKH to initiate planning ex¬
tending Renntier into a broad strike at Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula.^ For
planning purposes, the staff of AOK Norwegen could assume the use of four German
divisions and the active cooperation of local Finnish forces.^7 Further, it could
be assumed that a supply depot would be situated in the Rovaniemi area. Haider
noted that the question of command in the event of a German-Finnish war with the
Soviet Union would merit consideration; the command structure was likely to be
O
unnecessarily complex. Operational study for "Silberfuchs" - officially desig-
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nated as "joint operations against the Soviet Union from northern and central
Finland"^ - commenced upon von Falkenhorst's return to Oslo, under the supervi¬
sion of Buschenhagen.
Meanwhile, sabers rattled in the north. As Soviet forces concentrated along
the Finnish border, Mannerheim requested Ryti's authorization for mobilization, a
request supported by his chief of staff and his minister of defense; Ryti, and
Rangell, refused.^ Haider noted on 18 January that the possibility existed
"that Russia will react to our entry into Bulgaria with an attack on Finland."''^
On 19 January, Emil Karl Josef Wiehl of the Wi.Abt. reported from the AA, "the
Soviet-Finnish negotiations on the Petsamo concession are approaching acute cri¬
sis stage," and that the Soviets had threatened "to settle the matter by resort
12
to certain measures" if agreement could not be arrived at soon. The next day
the AA, after prompting by the OKW, asked Finland to take steps to provide pro¬
tection for the Kolosjoki mining facilities. Witting and Walden agreed; a few
Finnish military guards were posted on the grounds.^ On the same day, 20 Janu¬
ary, von Blucher reported from Helsinki "that Russian deliveries of flour, ocher,
arid oil cake to Finland have been abruptly stopped and that transit through Rus-
1 ^4-
sia of Finnish goods for Turkey has been suspended by the Russians." With Red
Army forces remaining combat ready in the far north, von Blucher touched on the
concern that these events had engendered in the OKW when he wrote on 26 January
that "the plan of the Russians to obtain control of ... the nicked mines is also
of significance in the military field. The facilities belonging to the nickle
mines lie on both sides of the Arctic Highway. Because all German supply of pro¬
visions and munitions for northern Norway has recently been shifted to the Arctic
Highway, supply operations would unavoidably become subject to Russian control if
the Russians get possession of the mine facilities."^5 Essentially, if the Pet¬
samo region fell to Soviet control, German forces in Finnmark would be out on a
limb, literally. But of even greater concern was the distinct possibility that,
if the Soviets advanced, Hitler would order Renntier launched. The OKW and the
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OKH, for once in accord, viewed with dread any possibility of a German-Soviet
clash prior to completion of the Barbarossa preparations.
On 27 January Buschenhagen completed the first rough draft of Silberfuchs.
The plan assumed "at least the passive participation of Sweden" and "the active
participation of Finland with an army capable of waging the war offensively ac¬
cording to operational directives given by Germany." The possibility of a Soviet
strike against Finland prior to the operation was noted; that the Finnish Army
would not actively defend the Petsamo region accepted. It was assumed that the
main burden of operations in the north was to fall upon the Finnish forces, which
were projected to provide security for the south coast including the Aaland Is¬
lands, defend its border northwest of Lake La^o^a with weak forces, and unlease
its main force for a drive east of Lake La^oc^a towards the Svir River. The pri¬
mary German attack would be directed along the route Rovaniemi to Salla to Kanda¬
laksha to seal off Soviet forces in the Kola region and sever the Murmansk rail¬
way. The German units for this operation were to be designated as the 36th Korps
(two divisions and SS-Nord) and the Finnish III Corps (two divisions). The SS
Kampfgruppe was to provide mobile advanced security for the concentration of
these forces. Finnish units would be utilized for a secondary strike from Suo-
mussalmi via Ukhta towards Kern. On reaching the Murmansk railway at Kandalaksha,
XXXVI Corps would turn north and, in conjunction with the Gebirgkorps, clear the
Kola Peninsula and occupy Murmansk and Polarnyy. The Finnish III Corps, with at¬
tached German units, if possible linking with forces advancing on Kern, would ad¬
vance south behind the eastern wing of the Finnish Army towards the Svir River.
AOK Norwegen would provide all German units for the operations, retaining approx¬
imately five divisions for the defense of Norway; construction, supply, and com¬
munication troops along with horse-drawn and motor transport would have to be
supplied from Germany. It was projected that the Finnish High Command would
claim overall command since their troops would be the most prominent, in terms of
numbers.17 It was this initial draft that Buschenhagen presented on 1 February
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19^+1 to the OKW and OKH when he travelled to Berlin to receive copies of "Auf-
marschanweisung Barbarossa." It would becone the basis for all conceptions - and
misconceptions - of German strategy in Finland.
On 27 January, Field Marshal Mannerheim received an invitation from the OKH
to allow one of his staff officers to travel to Germany to lecture on the course
18
and lessons of the Winter War. Mannerheim selected no less an officer than
Heinrichs, who departed immediately for Germany; however, the steamer he was a-
board was delayed due to ice in the Baltic and the lectures were not begun until
30 January. A score of officers, from the OKW as well as the OKH, heard Heinrichs
le
speak of tactical and strategic principals developed by the Finnish command for
warfare in the far north.^9 Neither von Brauchitsch nor Haider, due to the of-
20
ficial policy of the Reich, were able to attend the lectures. However, Haider,
following a ceremony to distribute decorations, spoke with Heinrichs, inviting
P1
the Finnish officer to a lunch to be followed by an afternoon meeting. At one
p.m. on 30 January Heinrichs and Haider met for lunch, a purely social occasion.
Only for a moment did the conversation slip the bonds of the mundane; Haider re¬
called the German-Finnish "Waffenbruder" of 1918 and suggested that the situation
could arise once more and then expressed hope that Finland would .join the Reich
in an advance on Leningrad. Heinrichs curtly replied that he was certain that
22
neither Mannerheim nor Ryti would consent to such a venture. At four-thirty
p.m. Haider met with Heinrichs formally, with Paulus present. Haider requested,
and received, the information that Finnish mobilization would take approximately
nine days. "Quick mobilization, but not unobtrusive.Colonel General Haider
informed Heinrichs that one and a half divisions would advance via Petsamo against
p/i
Murmansk and its railway. Heinrichs told Haider that, in case of war, the Fin¬
nish Army would place four army corps in the Lake Ladto^a region, sending five
divisions south and three divisions north of the lake.^9 Three Finnish divisions
would advance in the Lake Onega region and two divisions on the Soviet base at
Hanko. Finnish intelligence estimated there to be fifteen divisions of the Red
Army currently massed along the border. The meeting was brief and superficial.
Yet the OKH had obtained information on the mobilization and projected deployment
of the Finnish Army and a rebuff on the topic of cooperation in seizing Lenin¬
grad. And Heinrichs, in turn, was to report that there could be little doubt
that the Reich was seriously considering a conflict with the Soviet Union, a war
of aggression in which the German leaders expected Finland to be involved. When
Heinrichs observed that any possible collaboration must be decided by the politi¬
cal leadership, Haider replied that it would be sensible for the military leader¬
ship to prepare for all contingencies meanwhile.^ On this note, the meeting
pOterminated.ci
Coinciding with Heinrich's visit,^ on 31 January the OKH submitted "Auf-
marschanweisung Barbarossa" (No. 050/^1 g.K.), the deployment directive for their
command, to Hitler. It assigned each army's orders and targets, designated AG
headquarters, specified time limits and chain of command.^ "The active partici¬
pation of Rumania and Finland in a war against the Soviet Union is to be antici¬
pated on the flanks of the operation.Section Six concerns AOK Norwegen and
and emphasises the defense of Norway; in general terms, the OKH directive places
the operations to secure Petsamo and strike at Murmansk and Kandalaksha under the
command of von Falkenhorst.^ The Gebirgkorps was to "advance into the Petsamo
area at the start of the main operations, or if necessary even earlier, and, to¬
gether with Finnish forces, defend it against attacks from the land, sea, and air
..." and to "envelop, and later, when sufficient assault forces are available,
capture Murmansk as a base for offensive action."-^ By Section Nine, after Fin¬
land entered the war, the mission of the Finnish Army would be to take Hanko,
cover the deployment of German forces, and - at the latest when AG Nord crossed
the Dvina - launch an offensive east and west of Lake La^o^a, with the main ef¬
fort eastward, to effect a junction with the German Army in the Volkhov-Tikhvin
area.^4" AOK Norwegen units involved in the invasion were to begin moving into
position on 15 February 19^1, utilizing transit rights in Sweden and Finland.^
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On 1 February 19^1 Buschenhagen, after delivering the draft for Silberfuchs
and obtaining a copy of the OKH deployment directive for AOK Norwegen, met with
■2C
Haider.^ A number of points were made, all relating to Silberfuchs. Buschenha¬
gen explained that to position the Gebirgkorps for Eenntier would require two
months utilizing an optimum sea route, or three months utilizing a combination of
sea and land routes, or five months utilizing the current transport facilities.
The SS brigade could arrive in position at Kemijarvi in seven days. One month's
supply of munitions and food would be carried by the advancing German units in
Finland on B-Tag. Haider informed Buschenhagen that four divisions would be in¬
volved in the operation - one and a half divisions in the far north, two divi¬
sions in the Salla region, and the SS-Nord brigade. The possibility of a Soviet
strike at Finland was discussed; a possibility which would, if ever a reality,
automatically trigger the 2nd Geb.Div. occupation of the Petsamo region.37
Each AG had been informed of its mission as stipulated in Directive 21 and
ordered to carry out intercommand map maneuvers during January for the purpose of
detailed examination of proposed action. A number of command post exercises took
place at each AG headquarters; ideas formulated on these occassions were debated
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in detail during OKH staff meetings. Haider briefed Hitler on 3 February on
these exercises, and informed Hitler of his conversation with Heinrichs.39 Hai¬
der stated that but one and a half divisions were free to advance on Murmansk,
while an equal force was to be moved to central Finland via Sweden and would
strike eastwards. The Finnish Army, he continued, would commit four corps in
south Finland: five divisions striking towards Leningrad, three towards Lake One¬
ga, and two towards Hanko. All the Finnish advances would require strong, active
German aid.^® Hitler listened impassively and approved the OKH deployment direc¬
tive, adding that "the world will hold its breath at the launching of Operation
^4-1
Barbarossa." Hitler's restless anxiety about the ability of his generals to
conduct Barbarossa with sufficient daring and determination was apparent; on the
following day he revealed his intention of following OKH preparations in detail.^
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On February Hitler discussed the naval aspect of Barbarossa with Raeder.
It was tacitly assumed that Finland would allow her harbors and naval craft to be
used for the laying of a mine field across the Gulf of Finland and her airfields
for raids on the Soviet Baltic fleets and the White Sea Canal.^ The OKM could
commit only two cruisers, six destroyers, three torpedo boats, twenty-three U-
boats, four mine-layers and four mine-sweepers, eleven ice-breakers and twenty-
five to thirty transports to Finnish coastal waters, both in the Gulf of Finland
and the Arctic Ocean.
On 8 February Mannerheim informed Rossing of the development of yet another
crisis situation in Soviet-Finnish relations and wanned of what Soviet control of
Petsamo would mean to the OKH supply system in Finland. The OKW learned on 12
February from Horn that the Soviets were demanding the management of the Petsamo
mines and the majority of the ore.On 18 February the Soviet-Finnish negotia-
k6
tions were deadlocked and, for all practical purposes, ended. On 19 February,
under pressure from the AA, a nick^S matte agreement between Germany and Finland
v/as finally signed.^ On 20 February, Juho Kusti Paasikivi resigned his post as
Finnish envoy in the Kremlin; Witting informed von Blucher of this development
the next day. The Finns attempted, through the military attaches, to secure
direct German military support at this point; but the AA informed the OKW that
the negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union were being followed closely
Lq
and that there was no danger of the Soviets using force. y The OKW accepted
their judgement and rebuffed Finnish pleas.
Meanwhile, preparations for the invasion continued apace. In February Jodl
and his associates in the OKW prepared propaganda material for the invasion,
drafted regulations for the administration of occupied Soviet territory, and co¬
ordinated inter-forces functions. On 20 February Goring formed a small OKL staff
for Barbarossa planning under his own supervision near Berlin.^ The Finnish
state radio was engaged in a systematic pro-German campaign. Glamorized biogra¬
phies of German leaders were regularly transmitted for Finnish listeners; Hitler's
63
Mein Kampf was translated and circulated in large editions; and an official Fas¬
cist magazine appeared on Finnish newstands.^'' Radio intercept stations, the on¬
ly reliable source of intelligence available to the OKH/OKW prior to hostilities,
were established in Finland during the month. Because of insufficient personnel
and inadequate equipment these stations were unable to reach very deeply into the
interior, their range being limited to the territories near the Finnish border.
Reports from Abwehr agents in Finland did supply some front line information.
Special high-altitude equipment for air reconnaissance was unavailable for the
Fifth Luftflotte.^ In February the OKW inquired of the Finnish authorities on
possible improvement of various roads in the far north, particularly the one
leading northeast from Ivalo towards the Soviet border. The Finns took the un-
subtle hint and began upgrading surface transport routes as soon as weather con-
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ditions permitted.
But complications were arising for German strategy in Finland. The Aaland
Islands were now listed as a potential objective. On 14 February, Haider noted
that the OKH had determined that the Aaland chain must be occupied; and he men-
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tions a possible "conditional German Occupation." To guarantee the flow of
supplies to the fronts in Finland this was a logical prerequisite and was soon
incorporated into the list of objectives - for the Finnish forces. On 11 Febru¬
ary the OKH informed AOK Norwegen that only a portion of its rear area personnel
and vehicles requested could be supplied and that SS-Nord was not to be used in
the projected operations. Taking these limitations into account, AOK Norwegen
was to investigate and report on the possibility of execution of its operations.
Buschenhagen replied that the occupation of Petsamo could be carried out at any
moment on order; but the destruction of Soviet forces defending Murmansk might
not be accomplished. AOK Norwegen proposed to pursue the Silberfuchs study, but,
due to the new limitations on support personnel, it would no longer be possible
to turn forces south in support of Finnish operations until a base of supply had
been created at Kandalaksha.55 Questions involving OKL strikes at Hanko and the
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White Sea Canal, their feasibility and effectiveness, arose.^
In February, SS-Brigadefuhrer Gottlob Berger, acting on information suppos¬
edly obtained from pro-German Finnish military officers, formally requested that
an attempt to recruit a battalion of Finns into the Waffen SS be made. On 13
February Himmler gave his permission to the project.5? A few days later Berger
informed the AA that seven hundred Finns had applied at the DGH for enlistment in
the Waffen SS and that the Eeichsfuhrer-SS had approved of their enlistment.^
On 22 February von Eibbentrop informed von Weizsacker of the project, setting the
figure at seven hundred fifty.^9 On 1 March Berger announced that the SS intended
within the next two days to dispatch an SS medical team to Helsinki to commence
physical examinations. Since, as yet, no word of this plan had been mentioned to
the Finnish government, the AA requested that Berger delay the mission while it
sent Kivimaki to Helsinki to gain the opinion of his superiors. In the meantime,
an inquiry to the DGH brought the AA the reply that the number of Finns who had
applied was not seven hundred but less than twenty-four, and that they wanted to
enlist in the Wehrmacht, not the SS. By this point, Kivimaki had returnes with
the information that both the civilian and military authorities of his country
were "basically friendly" to the recruiting of an all-Finnish unit for service
with the German forces and felt that it would revive the "Waffenbruderschaft"
which had once linked the two nations.01^ They had no steadfast objection to the
Waffen SS so long as the Finnish volunteers were given a status seperate from
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that of collaborator units recruited in occupied nations. A semi-clandestine
private committee headed by two pro-German conservative nationalists, P.H. Norr-
men and E. Riekki, was formed to handle the recruitment. In two months the a-
greed upon number of recruits was reached; Witting announced in May 19^1 that
some one thousand two hundred total had been found acceptable. The unit was to
be purely Finnish, to be returned to Finland after its tour of service, and to
serve only as a component of the divisions SS-Nordland or SS-Wiking. When the
Finnish committee attempted to press for other conditions, notably limitations of
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combat use, the SS refused in April to allow any further conditions to be consid¬
ered. Thus, by April, when the first Finnish volunteers completed their training
p
in Germany, Finnish youths appeared in the uniforms of the Reich.
In late February, Lieutenant General Hans Georg von Seidel, Quartermaster
General OKL, visited Helsinki. Von Seidel was ostensibly to inspect the OKL sup¬
ply route. While there he met socially with Mannerheim, who presented his high-
ranking guest with the Grand Cross of the Finnish White Rose.^ Von Seidel did
not discuss questions of an operational nature and generally avoided political
comments; in his meetings with Heinrichs and Talvela he discussed logistic af¬
fairs, primarily concentrating upon the transit route. He expressed the desire
to inspect the air bases and OKL construction sites along the eastern border;
then he proceeded north to study the logistics problems for the Rovaniemi area.
Tactical and strategic points were not discussed.^ He departed Finland within a
few days.
On 18 February, Colonel Buschenhagen arrived in Helsinki for an extended
tour.^5 por two days he was engaged in a series of conferences with officers of
the Finnish General Staff; Buschenhagen paid an official call to Mannerheim, and
met with Heinrichs, Airo, and Tappola. For the OKW/OKH these conversations were
of immense value. Buschenhagen carried out all discussions in a cautious manner
and repeatedly emphasized that all deliberations were hypothetical; yet he also
stressed that the topics under discussion were to be relayed to a very select
group of officers only. Buschenhagen learned, from a remark by Airo, that Fin¬
land expected German forces to occupy the Aaland chain. Heinrichs felt that So¬
viet Russia might offer Finland sections of Karelia to keep Finland neutral dur-
ing a German-Russian conflict. Buschenhagen noted that "the Finns, with all
their deliberations, are concerned with interests which nevertheless are primari¬
ly local.Also, Buschenhagen was given to understand that the Finnish Army
could and would cover the OKW/OKH concentration of forces prior to B-Tag. Bus¬
chenhagen had expressed the desire to inspect certain areas in the north, list-
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ing Ka.jaani, Kuusamo, Rovaniemi, Kemijarvi, the Petsamo region and the Salla re¬
gion. He wished to study the terrain, possibilities of troop deployment, and Fin¬
nish fortifications. With Tappola, and various local commanders, Buschenhagen
r o
toured.0 However, these surveys were superficial for he had little time and the
season was adverse.^ But he did gather precious information for "Blaufuchs",
the troop concentration plan.''7® Buschenhagen had, during the trip, mentioned the
German interest in neutralizing Murmansk and isolating the Kola region in the
event of war.^ Finnish mobilization was discussed, conditional upon certain
events. Finally, on 28 February, Buschenhagen crossed into Norway.^
When Buschenhagen returned to Oslo from Finland, planning for Silberfuchs
was still incomplete; too many factors remained undetermined. Sweden in response
to cautious AA inquiries in February 19^1, would allow OKW transit of its terri¬
tory only in response to a Soviet attack on Finland. On 6 March Goring wrote the
Swedish premier, Hansson, stating that "Sweden must soon decide its position in
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any Russo-German conflict" and pointing out that Finland's attitude v/as clear.'^
Hansson was unmoved. It was concluded that, for planning purposes, OKW transit
of Sv/eden prior to B-Tag could not be assumed. On 2 March, the OKW emphasized,
in a communication with AOK Norwegen, that "all preparations which extend to
other states can only commence after authorization from the political leader¬
ship."^ In Finland's case, it was not to be given until May 19^1.^5 On 8 March
Buschenhagen reported to Hitler that, due to the poor road network in north Fin¬
land as compared to that available around Murmansk, any direct German drive on
Murmansk held little hope for success.7^ On the same day Hitler decreed that
Dietl's forces were to be reinforced by a mobile armored group; then forbid the
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use of the panzers across open tundra.
One positive step v/as taken. Haider had recognized the necessity of a liai¬
son staff for coordination of operations with the Finnish General Staff. Haider,
on 8 March, noted that a liaison staff "Nord" would have to be organized and
functioning prior to B-Tag. Almost immediately, the OKH began personnel stud-
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ies to prepare such a staff for transfer north.
On 4 March two British cruisers and five destroyers had appeared off Svol-
vaer in the Lofotens, shelled the town, sank several German ships in the harbor,
and sent a raiding party ashore capturing over two hundred German prisoners.
Although the raid had no military significance, it aroused in Hitler an over¬
whelming concern for the security of Norway. On 11 March Hitler ordered von Fal-
kenhorst and Buschenhagen and Boehm, in command of OKM forces in the Arctic
fin
north, to Berchtesgaden. At a conference on 12 March Hitler stressed the de¬
fensive mission of AOK Norwegen. He ordered additional coastal batteries to Nor¬
way to be emplaced by mid-May; existing troop strength was not only not to be re¬
duced by withdrawals for Barbarossa but to be increased in the Kirkenes-Narvik
region. As for offensive measures, Petsamo was still to be occupied and defended;
but the operation against Murmansk was to be carried through only when sufficient
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forces were available. The capture of Murmansk had been reduced in scope and
its execution made tentative. Buschenhagen noted that only fifty percent of the
units in Norway were now free for operations against the Soviet Union. For Sil-
berfuchs, two Geb.Div. would advance in the north and the 169th Division, joined
Op
by one Finnish division, would strike east from Salla.
Another consequence of the 4 March Svolvaer raid was that von Falkenhorst,
who as armed forces commander in Norway was subordinate to OKW but as commanding
general AOK Norwegen was tactically subordinate to OKH, was now placed under the
command of the OKW in both capacities. However, that left the German army in
Norway under the OKW while on Norwegian soil and under the OKH for Barbarossa
planning and operations.^ Von Brauchitsch had long harbored a "smouldering re¬
sentment" at the exclusion of the OKH from the Norwegian campaign in April 19^0;
this was now aggrevated by the changes in plans and command ordered by Hitler for
AOK Norwegen.^ On 18 March, von Brauchitsch declared that "he was leaving it to
OKW to issue all orders" concerning the advances from Finland.''^ Hitler agreed.
On 18 March the OKW assumed responsibility for the direction of Renntier, Platin-
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fuchs, Polarfuchs, and all supportive operations. On 21 March, Haider noted
dryly that "Group Falkenhorst" would be directed by the OKW.0?
The subsequent dispersion of military effort in Finland was the result of
the complex division of command which placed demands upon the German and Finnish
forces from three directions - the Finnish General Staff, the OKH, the OKW. Fol¬
lowing von Brauchitsch's declaration, the OKW planned to offer the command of all
operations in Finland to Mannerheim; although he might refuse to assume responsi¬
bility for attacks conducted by predominately German forces to obtain Hitler's
OO
strategic objectives. Eventually he retained command only in the south, where
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Finnish formations were in the majority. As a result, the German operations in
north Finland - Silberfuchs - were controlled by the OKV/ through AOK Norwegen,
the headquarters of which was split into two sections, one in Oslo and the other
over one thousand miles away in Finland. However, because the OKW lacked the ne¬
cessary organizations, the German units handling supply and transit, numbering
thirty-six officers and eight hundred thirty-four troops, would remain under OKH/
OKL control. Further, the OKH, through the liaison staff it established, advised
Mannerheim on operational matters; the OKW had no such comparable liaison with
the Finnish Army. Finally, coordination of action between B.Finn., the AOK Nor¬
wegen headquarters in Rovaniemi, and the Finnish command in the south, and of
each of them with AG Nord under the direction of OKH, was virtually impossible.
Added to this problem was Hitler's decision to weaken the eastward thrust in the
far north by retaining a majority of troops in Norway for static defense. Fur¬
ther dispersion resulted from the decision to deliver two seperate advances, both
having barely sufficient forces to attain their objectives, rather than one mas¬
sive drive.^ This led to requests for the allotment of Finnish formations to
lend support and to carry out secondary operations. These requests and the de¬
mands of their own political and strategic aims forced the Finns to divide their
army in June between five seperate operations - the main advance on the Svir
River comprising thirteen divisions, a corps committed to Silberfuchs, a batta-
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lion in support of the Gebirgskorps, the forces for the occupation of the Aaland
chain, and forces to isolate and contain the Hanko base. (Later, a further oper¬
ation was launched on the Karelian Isthmus.) Once committed to these operations,
the Finnish and German forces were prevented from swift concentration of troops
for exploitation of advantages by the sparse road and rail system. It is empha¬
sized that these two decisions, both made in March 19^1, had great detrimental
impact on military strategy in Finland. Perhaps more than any other factor,
these decisions brought about the failure of German operations in the north.
(in reviewing this disastrous division of command, one should note that two
viable alternatives existed. One, the most obvious, was to place the German for¬
ces under the command of Mannerheim and allow him to have a strong role in the
planning of operations in the far north. Although this situation had not occur¬
red before in the present conflict, the precedent of placing German troops under
foreign commanders had been established during the course of the First World War.
As detailed later, the OKW eventually withdrew from this possibility. The most
effective command system would have been to adopt the methods utilized in dealing
with the other German allies - notably the Italians, the Rumanians, and the Hun¬
garians - to place them under the AG responsible for that section of the front.
Thus the Finnish and AOK Norwegen German forces would have been placed under the
command of AG Nord, with which they were to eventually link. In effect this
would have placed all forces in Finland under OKH tactical and strategic command.
Orders would have been passed to Mannerheim's command and B.Finn, from Zossen.
To this would be added coordination of logistics, with Finnish and German troops
able to draw from AG Nord stocks. It is uncertain whether this alternative was
ever seriously considered by OKH/OKW. It is inexplicable that the Finns were
allowed the latitude in military affairs that the other allies were denied.)
The Reich expected great advances in the north. On 17 March Hitler observed
that success must be won from the start and that there must be no reverses.
Therefore, no operations should include "forces that we cannot count on with cer-
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tainty." He then stated that only German and, to a lesser degree, Finnish troops
could be relied upon for offensive operations. Haider wrote, "No illusion over
allies! Finns will fight valiantly, but are weakened by Winter War."^ For their
valiance, the Finns were to be rewarded with all the Soviet territory to the
White Sea.
The 6th and 7th SS Totenkopf-Standarten had been transferred to AOK Norwegen
in late 19^0. They were reorganized with a signals unit to constitute SS Kampf-
gruppe Nord. SS-Nord had been placed under the tactical command of von Falken-
horst for use in Silberfuchs; Himmler, however, retained the right to withdraw it
for SS tasks at any time.9^ In March 19^1 elements of SS-Nord were readied for
transport to north Norway, where it was to assemble near Kirkenes. From there it
was to proceed south along the Arctic Highway to concentrate near Rovaniemi for
its resurrected role in Barbarossa. The SS Kampfgruppe had, in March, been rein-
cluded in the operation because, as the only major motorized force available to
AOK Norwegen, it alone was capable of making the long overland march from Kirkenes
to Rovaniemi in the alloted time.9?
In addition to the rising German military interest in Finland, rather expli¬
cit assurances of support had finally come from the AA. On 5 March Kivimaki was
informed by von Weizsacker that the German position had been "definitely deter¬
mined" and Finland could face "with complete assurance all surprises ..." Two
days later, Kivimaki learned from the AA that a turn of events "very advantageous
for Finland" had occurred.^ In response, on 2 April, Witting expressed his at¬
titude to von Blucher, saying that "as a small country, Finland could at present
pursue no policy of her own choice, but had to adapt herself to circumstances."95
While German-Finnish relations were warming, German-Soviet relations were cooling.
On 27 March, Ribbentrop had informed Yosuke Matsuoka, Japan's minister in Berlin,
that diplomacy with the Soviet Union was "correct but deteriorating. If Russia
makes a false move she will be crushed." He later told Matsuoka that German re¬
sistance to the Soviet Union with respect to Finland was based on economics and
71
sentiment; Germany could never allow Finland to fall to Soviet Russia.0'0 Con¬
versely, as German-Soviet relations collapsed, Soviet-Finnish tension eased. In
conversations with Ryti, Rangell, and Witting in April, von Blucher learned of
various signs of relaxation which had become evident in Finnish-Soviet relations.
They pointed to the recent absence of Soviet pressure in the Petsamo question,
the absence of anti-Finnish broadcasts, and the obliging attitude of the Soviet
Helsinki legation.On 5 April, Zotov, whom the Finnish authorities had found
extremely difficult, was replaced by T. Orlov, a cultured and friendly man, sym¬
pathetic to Finland's position. On 25 April Tipp^eskirch reported from Moscow,
"It was noticed here too, that relations between Finland and the Soviet Union
have recently become more serene."^ Ironically, on 20 April, Hitler summoned
Ribbentrop to Vienna and informed him of the decision to attack Soviet Russia.
Hitler cautioned that no demarche was to be sought by the AA; no diplomacy would
make him change his mind about Russia's attitude, which was quite clear to him,
and it might well deprive him of the weapon of tactical surprise.^9
Due to the severe revisions in objectives and chain of command for AOK Nor-
wegen, its planning for Barbarossa had come to a virtual halt during March 19^1.
On 7 April an OKW directive implementing the revised "Aufmarschanweisung" pro¬
vided a basis for the resumption of planning.''®® It was entitled "Weisung an den
i 01
Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Norwegen uber seine Aufgaben im Fall Barbarossa."IU The
reinforced 2nd Geb.Div. was to be held ready for the occupation of Petsamo, but
with a proviso that the forces defending the Narvik-Kirkenes region not be re¬
duced below eighteen battalions. Whether enough strength could then be mustered
for a thrust to Murmansk and Polarnyy depended on a number of unforeseen condi¬
tions, but the necessary preparations were to be made and as many troops as pos¬
sible assembled. The operation further south, codenamed Polarfuchs, would have
Kandalaksha as its first objective; further development would depend on the situ¬
ation. For the concentration of forces the Swedish transit would presumably not
be available.''®^ SS-Nord was to travel south along the Arctic Highway to Rovani-
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emi. The headquarters for the newly constituted XXXVI Corps and an infantry di¬
vision were to travel north to Rovaniemi. Since the troops would be in movement
a week prior to B-Tag, the shift was to be disguised as an exchange of units for
the relief of the Kirkenes garrison.
Movements began immediately. Operation "Fischzug", the concentration of SS-
Nord in Kirkenes, had already begun. "Wallfahrt", the shift of the 199th Divi¬
sion from south Norway to Troms was to take place between 25 April and 3 June.
"Herkules" was to shift the 3ud Geb.Div. to east Finnmark between 30 April and 21
June. And "Siegfried" was the concentration of the 2nd Geb.Div. south of Kir¬
kenes.In April the 48th Panzer Jager Abt. was added to Herkules and MG-Bat-
talion 4 v/as ordered sent to Rovaniemi as reinforcements in June.^®-^
By the operation orders, issued on 20 April by AOK Norwegen, Gr. XXXVI was
to execute the main German strike, Polarfuchs, at Kandalaksha. Gr. XXXVI was now
to consist of the 169th Division, SS Kampfgruppe Nord, the Finnish 6th Division
(detached from III Corps), two battalions of panzers, a bridge construction bat¬
talion, two construction battalions, two motorized artillery battalions, a heavy
weapons battalion, a communications battalion, two batteries of OKL artillery,
and a Nebelwerfer battery. After assembly, on B-Tag XXXVI Corps was to advance
units along the Rovaniemi-Kandalaksha road, seizing the Salla salient and occupy¬
ing Kandalaksha, cutting the Murmansk railway.Due to uncertainty concerning
the extent of Finnish preparation, the April order to Gr. XXXVI was tentative.
AOK Norwegen proposed a secondary attack, probably by the Finnish 6th Division,
from Kuusamo via Kestenga to Loukhi and a combat reconnaissance via Ukhta towards
Kem. The commanding general of the XXXVI Gen.Kdo. General Hans Feige, suggested
employing his forces in a northward strike behind Salla at Kayrala to deny the
Soviet forces a defense in depth; but the terrain and road network were unfavor¬
able for such an envelopment tactic.''^ His forces were to drive directly on
Kandalaksha as ordered. Meanwhile, a large headquarters camp for XXXVI Gen.Kdo.
v/as begun near Rovaniemi.
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On 18 April, Dietl received his orders from AOK Norwegen. Dietl was criti¬
cal of these OKW plans, especially of the advance on Murmansk and Polarnyy, code-
named "Platinfuchs", to follow Renntier. In Berlin in late April he reported
that five regiments stood ready, but, due to terrain and natural defensive posi¬
tions and strong Soviet forces, they were not sufficient. Dietl requested more
mechanized vehicles and panzers.He was made "Befehlshaber im Polarbereich"
by the OKW and given instead the 199th Division, a machine gun battalion, a po¬
lice battalion, and numerous assorted artillery batteries.'''"-'
There was no plan for initiation of the Finns until 28 April, when Warlimont
of OKW drafted one for submission to Hitler. Warlimont proposed that "military
conferences must be preceded by political contacts." There should be two major
military conferences between Finnish and German staff officers. During the first,
to be held in Germany, Jodl was to reveal "the mission with which the Finns will
be charged." After the Finns had had a few days to study the information, a se¬
cond conference "to clarify any possible dubious problems" would be held. In
both conferences, German intentions would be camouflaged by "a) the overall plan
not being mentioned at all and b) the intentions from the Finnish area being re-
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presented as possible necessary offensive-defensive measures." On the day he
postponed B-Tag until 22 June, 30 April, Hitler approved Warlimont's proposal.
The formula to be utilized in all contact with the Finns was, "Major developments
possible in the west. Hence protection in the east necessary. Russia has occas-
sionally treated us in an unfriendly fashion, so we had better prepare ourselves
11?
for surprises." This fiction was to be observed faithfully by AA and military
officials involved in contact with their Finnish counterparts right until B-Tag.
On 6 May, AOK Norwegen issued "Befehl fur das Unternehmen Silberfuchs."''''^
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It was followed in a few days by "Anlage R", giving tactical assignments for
Renntier, and "Anlage P",''''^ detailing the Polarfuchs operation. Together these
three documents represent the core of German military strategy in Finland. On 22
June 19^+1 at 2:30 a.m. local time, the Gebirgskorps and support troops were to
7h
enter Finland.11^ The 3rd Geb.Div., the south flank of the advance, was to cross
the border near Kasiba, occupy Kolosjoki and take up defensive positions. The
2nd Geb.Div. on 22 June was to occupy Parkinna and Liinahamari, seizing the Sovi¬
et consulate and the docks; on the following day it was to occupy the north
coastal areas.It was assumed that the Finnish battalion "Ivalo" would pro-
11 8
vide support. German troops committed to Renntier numbered thirty-five thou¬
sand, supported by two thousand five hundred labor troops.119 jt was estimated
that the occupation would be completed within four days. Upon receipt of the
i PC)
prearranged command, Platinfuchs was to be initiated. Elements of the 2nd Geb.
Div. were to strike to isolate the Fisherman's Peninsula and drive on TitoVka.
To oppose any advance on Murmansk, German intelligence estimated the Red Army had
placed a full corps in the Kola region, the 10*fth Division based at Murmansk, the
52nd Division at MotoVsk, and the lAth Division in the Olenja-Balino area.1^1
For Polarfuchs, the OKW had alloted forty thousand six hundred troops, with the
163rd Division numbering fifteen thousand men in reserve.Movement of German
units from the north to Rovaniemi, Blaufuchs I, was to commence eight days prior
to B-Tag.1^ Blaufuchs II, the move of Gen.Kdo. XXXVI and certain units under
its command northward along the transit route, was to be complete by 15 June.
12A-
SS-Nord was to arrive in position on 19 June. The initial objective for Po¬
larfuchs was the Salla heights, just inside Soviet territory. Opposing this op¬
eration would be the 88th Division based at Kandalaksha, the 122nd Division at
Kuolajarvi, and the 5^th Division at K^em.
The OKL was prepared to commit three fighter squadrons, two bomber squad¬
rons, a Stuka flight, and a long-range bomber squadron to the offensives.1^7 The
possibility existed that the 14th Luftwaffe Division might be transferred to Gen.
Kdo. XXXVI.The request of Gen.Kdo. XXXVI for Stuka strikes at Salla and Kan¬
dalaksha on B-Tag was under study. But it was felt that, initially, OKL strikes
must be concentrated on Soviet airfields - Murmansk, Kandalaksha, U^ita, Pajarvi,
SV,
Hyskyjarvi, and Schujorjgak - to gain immediate air superiority. The OKL
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would be able to stage from certain Finnish fields - Oulu, Kemi, Rovaniemi, and
si p O
Kemijarvi - to increase operational time. Some five hundred OKL flak troops
were to man air defenses in Finland.^9
Preparations continued. On 8 May, sea and land transport for Blaufuchs I
and Blaufuchs II was ordered readied.^0 On 16 May, requests for the preparation
of specified roads and bridges for the Polarfuchs advance was made of the Finnish
High Command and German labor troops offered for this.^l Also on 16 May, the po¬
sition of "Admiral Polarkuste" was created to coordinate naval operations along
the Norwegian and Finnish and Soviet Arctic coastline."^2 On 17 May, the move¬
ment plans for SS-Nord were finalized and issued.^53 All of this activity was
highly visible. Von Blucher, unaware of the Barbarossa planning, noted the in¬
creased tempo of German military activity. "German military transports arrived
in increasing numbers. Lines of communication across Finland were established,
food and munition depots were established, roads and bridges in the west-east di¬
rection vrere improved."''^
On 12 May, Jodl informed Ritter of the AA that "it is now becoming urgent to
enter into detailed discussions with Finland concerning military cooperation,
particularly about further troop transports to Finland, a joint plan of opera¬
tions, High Command etc ... The military discussions should take place on the
assumption of a possible conflict originating with the Soviet Union. For this
purpose, the OKW would like to invite two Finnish General Staff officers to Ger¬
many as soon as possible."^35 p^g qkW sought advice on whether the invitation
should be tendered through military channels or through the AA. Jodl even sug¬
gested that Schnurre be sent, "because of his close personal relations with the
Finnish Minister President and the Finnish Foreign Minister."''-^ The Wilhelm-
strasse agreed.
Schnurre, officially in Helsinki for trade negotiations, met with Ryti on 20
May.^3? After the initial exchange of greetings, Schnurre proceeded to a review
of the Molotov November visit, suitably biased. Schnurre explained that German-
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Soviet relations had been deteriorating recently and that each side had therefore
taken "certain security measures of a military nature.It was not Hitler's
intention to precipitate a war, but the possibility of an armed conflict existed.
Germany would soon force either a diplomatic or a military solution to this un¬
easy state of affairs. Thus, the Reich required from Finland two things, a list
of points that Finland desired clarified for negotiations between Germany and the
Soviet Union and a visit by one or more staff officers of the Finnish Army to
Germany "to discuss how military measures should be coordinated" in the event of
a war.^59 Ryti, after consultation with other Finnish authorities - Mannerheim,
Rangell, Walden, and Witting - during a dinner, replied in the affirmative to
both requests. It was arranged that the "Finnish guests" would arrive in Germa¬
ny by special plane on May. ^ Schnurre signalled success to Ribbentrop on 22
May.lZf1
In preparation for the arrival of the Finnish delegation, a protocol for
discussion was issued by the OKW on 22 May. The Finnish representatives were to
be informed, in a limited way of the overall German operational plans, specifi¬
cally the seizure of the Baltic States and Leningrad by AG Nord, the operation of
the Luftwaffe from Finnish bases against Soviet targets, and the Silberfuchs plan.
The German requests to be made of Finland at this initial conference included the
transit of Gen.Kdo. XXXVI and an infantry division by rail north to Rovaniemi, an
early camouflaged mobilization of the Finnish armed forces, Finnish participation
11±p
in Polarfuchs, and a Finnish advance to the Svir River. Copies of this docu¬
ment were passed to the OKH, OKL, OKM, and possibly the AA.
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Fourth Phase: May 19^1 - June 19^1
"An alliance with the powerful is never to be trusted." - Phaedrus.^
p
"Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues." - Thomas Hobbs.
On 2k May the Finnish delegation deplaned to be met by Buschenhagen.-^ The
delegation was headed by Heinrichs and consisted of Colonel Kustaa A. Tappola of
operations, Colonel Einar N. Makinen of mobilization, Colonel Harald V. Roos of
logistics, and Commodore Sundman for the Finnish naval staff.^ The next day, 25
May 19^-1, they met at Salzburg with OKW representatives - Field Marshal Keitel,
General Jodl, Lieutenant General von Lossberg, Captain Leopold Burkner of Ab.Ausl.
OKW, Lieutenant Colonel Munch representing the AL, and Colonel Buschenhagen for
AOK Norwegen.^ Keitel opened the conference by conveying Hitler's greetings and
extending his personal regrets that the political situation had not allowed the
Reich to support Finland actively in the Winter War. Major developments in the
east were momentarily expected and all eventualities were being considered, some
of which demanded meticulous preparations. Thus, this conference of military re¬
presentatives of the two states. The difficulties which had prompted the brief¬
ing were "not acute" and no decisions were to be taken, "but it is our custom to
prepare everything thoroughly and in good time in order to be able to act quickly
when the hour strikes."7 After these remarks, Keitel turned the meeting over to
Jodl and withdrew.
General Jodl prefaced his delivery with remarks on the general military/po¬
litical situation. The Reich, he stated, maintained close commercial relations
with the USSR; but recently, an unwarranted concentration of the Red Army was oc¬
curring along the common frontier.^ During the winter and spring of 19^1, the
Soviet garrison in their western territories had increased to a total of one hun¬
dred eighteen infantry divisions, twenty cavalry divisions, five armored divi-
8^
sions and twenty-five armored brigades.^ The Reich had been compelled to assem¬
ble her own forces along the border as a countermeasure. A political clarifica¬
tion was hoped for in a short period; but should this fail to materialize, a set-
if)
tlement by military measures would be necessary. Finland would be affected in
either case. With a clash possible by early summer, the present discussion was
to provide the basis for Finnish-German cooperation. The Finnish officers would
be informed of German desires in Finland, the execution of which was to be left
for political decision by the Finnish government. With the participation of many
small states and the superiority of the Wehrmacht, the Soviet Union would soon be
A A
unable to continue the conflict. The war would rapidly develop into a crusade
A p
to destroy the Soviet empire. The collapse, predicted Jodl, would occur most
quickly in the north and the Baltic would soon be free of Soviet influence.^
Jodl then outlined, in brief, the projected offensive of AG Nord. through the Bal¬
tic States, supported by OKM and OKL operations against the Soviet Baltic fleets.
The intended chain of command in Finland was explained; in north and central Fin¬
land, command would be by OKW through von Falkenhorst with participating Finnish
troops under his direction and on the La^oda front, command by Mannerheim in con-
A]\
sultation with OKH with participating German forces under his command. A Ger¬
man liaison officer from the OKH would be placed at the Finnish headquarters.^5
Jodl then explained Renntier and Platinfuchs; German forces would occupy Petsamo
and two divisions would strike in the direction of Murmansk and Polarnyy. The
OKW wished Finland to mobilize forces around Petsamo, support the defense of Pet¬
samo, and provide scouts and reconnaissance units for Platinfuchs.''0 In the cen¬
tral Finnish theater, German forces would strike at Kandalaksha via Salla. Two
divisions, camouflaged as transit troops, would srpearhead the assault. The OKW
desired participation in this offensive by the Finnish III Corps or, as a minimum
commitment, by a single Finnish division as far as the pre-19^0 border.''^ "In
conjunction with the operations conducted by the OKH with the Army Group North
against Leningrad the mission of the Finns will be to immobilize Russian forces
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in the area of La^a. No demand is made for mounting a high-casualty assault to
achieve a breakthrough inasmuch as the Russian front there will collapse automa-
18
tically as the attack by Army Group North progresses." No more was expected of
the main Finnish forces than to engage as many Soviet units as possible until the
fall of Leningrad.^ "Of Finland, we hope only that it actively ties down Soviet
PO
units found on its borders at the outbreak of war." The subject of Hanko was
now considered; the OKW felt that it was imperative that the Soviet base be elim¬
inated. The Reich wanted Finnish forces to isolate Hanko and later, with OKL
P1
support, reduce the fortress.11 Jodl then requested the Finnish opinion on the
Aaland Islands; Heinrichs proposed occupation of four or five of the major is¬
lands by German or Finnish troops. Jodl stated that a decision would be obtained
from Hitler as to whether the Aaland chain would be occupied by German forces or
PP
not. Passing to the other services, Jodl informed Heinrichs that OKL opera¬
tions over the northern area necessitated the use of the airfields at Helsinki
and Kemi. In addition, the Finnish military was expected to provide antiaircraft
protection for debarking troops, the Rovaniemi area, and the Kemijarvi region.^
To coordinate naval activities, Jodl proposed a OKM-Finnish Navy conference in
Berlin to consider the defense of Finnish coastal waters, joint mining operations,
and accomodation of Finnish cargo tonnage.^ Finally, Jodl stated that the Fin¬
nish mobilization date should be flexible, dependent on the situation and the So¬
viet attitude in contemplated diplomatic negotiations. For the Reich, troop
movement would commence 5 June, with the first troops arriving in Finland on 8
25
June and the armor between 10 June and 15 June. Jodl then invited comments and
questions from Heinrichs on the German plans.
During Jodl's speech Heinrichs interrupted only twice to comment. First, in
relation to the Renntier-Platinfuchs operation, it would be possible to detach a
Finnish battalion for service with the Gebirgskorps. Secondly, he informed Jodl
that the Finnish Army would prefer to retain control of the III Corps for other
p/5
operations.- Heinrichs opened his response with the statement that "the delega-
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tion had listened to the review with interest but that it had no authority to
discuss political or military matters.He agreed to transmit all German re-
pQ
quests to Mannerheim; meanwhile, he could air his views. Heinrichs first stat¬
ed that he envisioned the main Finnish effort to be on the southeast front, and
proposed that Polarfuchs be a purely German operation. Jodl repeated the German
desire for the support of at least one Finnish division, which could be released
after the initial strike.^ Along the La^oc^a front, Heinrichs said, "the Finnish
forces will not limit themselves to waiting tactics but will attack as far as is
possible."5® Heinrichs next expressed his view that an isolation of the Hanko
base would engage two or three Finnish divisions; therefore he proposed that Han¬
ko be assaulted by German forces with Finnish participation under German command.
The OKW felt that to bring up the necessary German assault troops would be pos¬
sible only through Sweden, and currently such transit was not anticipated.5"1 In
relation to OKL operations, the Finnish delegation believed that the civil air¬
port at Helsinki could not be relinquished to military use and that the Finnish
antiaircraft system would require arms and munitions to fulfill its specified
function.-^ Indeed, Finland was facing shortages of food, munitions, motor and
aviation fuel.-^ Heinrichs proceeded to the topic of Finnish mobilization, de¬
claring that nine days would be needed for full mobilization. To conceal the mo¬
bilization somewhat, the eight western divisions would be mobilized first, fol¬
lowed by the eight eastern divisions.^
The entire discussion had remained hypothetical, at least in form. It was
agreed that further discussions were necessary with the representatives of the
OKL, OKM, OKH, AOK Norwegen, and OKW Transport Office, on the hypothetical offen¬
sive.-^ In closing, Heinrichs remarked that "the presence of the Finnish repre¬
sentatives indicates the Finnish attitude, even though the political authoriza¬
tion does not exist.The OKW was satisfied.
Buschenhagen escorted the Finnish officers to Berlin, where first they met
with representatives of WiRu.^? On 26 May, Haider welcomed the Finnish General
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Staff representatives at a luncheon, followed by a .joint staff meeting.^® Haider
had a transcript of the Salzburg discussion, so he was aware that Heinrichs would
make no commitments;-^ and Heinrichs repeatedly pointed out that he had no au¬
thority for any agreements. Haider wished to explore the prospects of Finnish
support in obtaining the objectives of AG Nord. He opened with general allusions
to the planned advance of AG Nord. When Haider mentioned possible Finnish
[tO
moves at Leningrad, Heinrichs declared that he could not discuss this matter. ^
Haider, pressing on, stated that the OKH hoped the Finnish Army could at least
prepare for an offensive either east or west of Lake Ladoga. Such an offensive
would eventually link with German forces, and the Baltic would be cleared of So¬
viet influence. Heinrichs estimated that some six divisions might be committed
east of La^o^a; more he could not say. Haider estimated that the Finnish Army
need not advance until fourteen days after B-Tag. Therefore Haider felt that
Finland should not mobilize, except for select forces, until after the outbreak
of hostilities. The Finns however, pointed out that troops would be mobilized to
cover the frontiers and German concentration; yet Heinrichs also stated that gen¬
eral mobilization, due to the limited rail facilities, could not begin until the
Blaufuchs operation was complete.^ Haider emphasized that the Finnish forces
must assume responsibility for Hanko and the Aaland Islands.^ The Finnish dele¬
gation declared that certain materials were in short supply, materials necessary
for any major offensive - antiaircraft weapons, one hundred to two hundred air-
Ll<=,
craft, tanks, trucks, and radio equipment. Haider could make no offers. The
meeting was over. Heinrichs declared again that political consent must be ob¬
tained prior to any military agreements. All specific details - such as direc¬
tion of attack and mobilization timetable - were consequently left undecided. A
visit to Helsinki was therefore arranged for one or more German officers in early
June. At this time, the Finnish government would, after consideration of Hein¬
richs ' reports on these May meetings, make its commitment, if it so chose.^
Meetings with the OKL and the OKM followed. Both sides obtained useful
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technical and tactical information, without any firm commitments being offered by
either. While preparing for departure on 28 May, Heinrichs requested Captain
Burkner's views on two points which were troubling him. One, how was Finland's
response to the meetings to be transmitted to Berlin, whether by diplomatic or
military channels. Two, which view of Finnish activities on the southeast front,
Jodl's request for an engaging of Soviet forces or Haider's for a full Finnish
offensive, was to be accepted as authoritative. ? Burkner responded that diplo¬
matic channels were to be utilized in transmitting the "political consent", and
that the OKW request was the minimum expected by the Reich and that Jodl would
not, of course, oppose any vigorous Finnish activity in the La^oc^a region. In
LO
any case, discussion on the latter topic could be continued in Helsinki in June.
Buschenhagen reported to AOK Norwegen, on 28 May, that the results of the joint
staff conferences were "not yet satisfactory, since the political authorization
was lacking."^9 He hoped to be informed of the Finnish decision in Helsinki on 3
June. Keitel ordered, the same day, that "any further discussions with the Finns
not go beyond the limits set by the discussions at Salzburg on May 25.Until
the political decision was made, military development was suspended. And Hitler
directed that the officers to be sent to Finland were to be kept to a minimum,
and their motives for the visits to Finnish authorities were to be camouflaged.^
Meanwhile, difficulties in the details of Silberfuchs had arisen. In the
course of preparations for the May conferences, it became obvious that the dates
for Polarfuchs were not realistic; the operation would have to be initiated later
than the main Barbarossa strikes. Buschenhagen reported this unpleasant fact to
OKW/OKH on 14 May; Haider's reaction was that the whole offensive plan for the
far north was rendered of dubious value.^ But the OKW was not to be put off;
Polarfuchs would proceed, even though delayed. SS-Nord was experiencing diffi¬
culties. The Kampfgruppe was essentially a police formation and had only recent¬
ly begun military training. Its officers of all ranks had no more military train¬
ing than they had been able to absorb during a short course of lectures and de-
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monstrations given them during the previous winter. The unit had fired its ar¬
tillery only once, and proficiency in the use of small arms was so low that pro¬
vision had to be made for target practice while the unit moved north. The march
to Kirkenes had been so poorly executed and revealed such a profound ignorance of
basic military procedure that it resulted in the replacement of the commanding
officer, SS-Brigadefuhrer Richard Herrman by SS-Brigadefuhrer Karl Demelhuber on
25 May.53 And yet this was the only mobile force available to AOK Norwegen.
On 31 May, Kivimaki, in response to Schnurre's request of Ryti, presented a
list of Finnish claims to the AA to be used in negotiations between Nazi Germany
and the Soviet Union. Finland desired a guarantee of her independence and wished
the restoration of her boundaries of 1939- Finland would permit Soviet Russia to
retain Karelian Isthmus areas felt vital for Leningrad's defense, if in exchange
Soviet areas in east Karelia were ceded to Finland. Finally, the Soviets were to
send relief supplies to Finland and surrender twenty trawlers in the Arctic
waters as a sign of good faith.5^ On 2 June Kivimaki stated that, if the Soviets
in negotiations refused to restore the lost Finnish territories, at least the
counter claims to control of the key Vallinkoski hydroelectric plant should be
settled in Finland's favor. On 6 June his government suggested that he limit
himself to demanding the return of lost territories.55 The AA kept the Finnish
envoy, and hence Witting, under the impression that Russo-German negotiations
would progress in normal fashion. The diplomats continued to function in a vacu¬
um.
On 2 June Colonel Buschenhagen and Colonel Eberhard Kinzel of the OKH ar¬
rived in Helsinki.5^ Prior to any conversations, Buschenhagen was presented with
a memo drafted by Heinrichs in close consultation with Mannerheim. It stated
that "the measures previously recommended" could be initiated when "the political
side of the question has been clarified." And, "the interest which has been a-
roused by these recommendations is not confined to operational or purely military
technical matters. The idea which underlies the expositions made by the highest
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German military authorities can not but inspire joy in Finland's martial soul ..."
The remainder of the memo dealt with the projected utilization of Finnish forces
in the prospective war.^ On 3 June Kinzel and Buschenhagen met with Heinrichs.
The Finnish General Staff, after considerable study and integration of informa¬
tion culled from the May Salzburg-Berlin meetings, revealed its plans. The main
Finnish forces would be concentrated in such a manner that, in accordance with
OKH wishes, an attack could be launched either east or west of Lake La^o^a with
five days notice. An attack east of the lake, which the Finns recognized as the
most strategically advantageous, could be opened with a force of five infantry
divisions and one infantry/cavalry division. Seven divisions would be employed
as they later became available. The Svir River was the objective, but it would
be achieved only under extremely favorable conditions.^ The Finnish General
Staff agreed to allow the III Corps to participate under German command in Polar-
fuchs.59 Buschenhagen suggested that the Finnish units need not go beyond the
1939 boundary, but Heinrichs stated that no such limitation was necessary.^® The
Finns agreed to isolate Hanko utilizing one division and to occupy the Aaland
chain with a single regiment.^ The Finns, further, agreed to the early landing
of the 169th Division at Finnish ports; however, they requested that SS-Nord in
Kirkenes not commence transit to Rovaniemi until B-Tag. Command in the south
was accepted by Mannerheim; von Falkenhorst would be in command north of the
rivers Ulo and Ulojoki.^ The Finns agreed to the use of the Helsinki and Kemi
airfields, along with other specified fields, for staging German combat mis¬
sions."^ Kinzel was informed that on 10 June Finland would mobilize the Ivalo
battalion in Petsamo and the Finnish antiaircraft units for the ports and the
frontier troops; on 15 June the III Corps and the forces for the Hanko and Aaland
operations would be mobilized; on 18 June, it was estimated, the general mobili¬
zation order would be issued.^ Kinzel proposed that a liaison staff be created
in Helsinki for exchange of intelligence and the handling of details on transit
and joint procedure. This was to take place as soon as possible due to the im-
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minent threat of war; the Finnish General Staff took this matter under study.^
Heinrichs noted also, in passing, that Mannerheim wished the Finnish SS recruits
returned for integration within the Finnish Army.^ In concluding the meeting,
Heinrichs "warned with deep earnestness against any attempt to set up any kind of
Quisling government which would immediately paralyze any further cooperation be-
ro
tween Finland and Germany."
Finland's concern extended beyond her tacit "alliance with the powerful" to
maintaining the proper fictions. The Finnish authorities were obsessed with cre¬
ating the appearance of a defensive war. The Finns steadfastly refused to engage
in the war unless the Soviet Union attacked Finland, in which case "the Finnish
people were unanimously resolved to ... defeat the Soviet forces."^9 phe sole
Finnish precondition for cooperation; the Finnish Army could not initiate hostil¬
ities nor would they allow initial OKW strikes to be launched from Finnish terri¬
tory. After listening to Heinrichs explain how the Finnish population found ag¬
gressive war unpalatable, Kinzel noted bluntly that "Finland would therefore wel¬
come it if the German operations jBarbarossaJ were begun first and hopes that it
will be provoked into an attack by the Russians.The Reich anticipated no
difficulties on this point. Except for limited air strikes and naval minelaying,
operations in the north would not begin for several days after B-Tag; during
these days there would be German troops massing on Finnish soil, the Hanko base
would be blockaded by a Finnish division, the Aaland Islands would be remilita¬
rized by Finland, and the Finnish Army would be in the process of full mobiliza¬
tion. The Soviets were sure to institute some form of preventive strike; Finland
would have its "casus belli." On 4 June Buschenhagen signalled Jodl that "Fin¬
land is now ready for full cooperation."^ On the same day he informed AOK Nor-
wegen that Blaufuchs could commence.^ Kinzel and Buschenhagen departed Helsinki
on 6 June.
The massive troop movements that comprised Blaufuchs followed Buschenhagen's
signal within the day; AOK Norwegen readied itself.^"5 On 5 June transport ships
conveying the 169th Division departed Stettin for Oulu; ships carrying the staff
of Gen.Kdo. XXXVI departed Oslo bound for Oulu.^ SS-Kampfgruppe Nord, having
barely completed its assembly at Kirkenes on 6 June, began its move south on 7
June.Elements of the 3rd Geb.Div. were moved into position along the Finnish-
Norwegian border; by 17 June the Gebirgskorps was ready. The transit/supply sys¬
tem in Finland, administered by separate OKL and OKH staffs and numbering six
hundred ninety-five OKL and eight hundred thirty-eight OKH troops, was placed un¬
der the command of "Heimatstab Nord" in June. Gebirgskorps Norwegen was to draw
its supplies from a cache in Narvik considered sufficient for one years opera¬
tions. The forces for Polarfuchs were initially provided with rations for three
months, ammunition for two to three months, fuel for two months.It was anti¬
cipated that by this time Polarfuchs and Platinfuchs would have been successfully
concluded.
The concentration of German forces in Finland revealed serious problems with
respect to supply and transport and communications. From its Oslo headquarters
AOK Norwegian had several routes of access to Finland, all tenuous: the sea route
around the Polar coast to Kirkenes and Petsamo, vulnerable to Soviet and British
naval action and within range of Soviet artillery at the entrance to Liinahamari
harbor; Reichstrasse 50 from Narvik to Kirkenes, suffering from the lack of ade¬
quate snow-removal equipment and an all-weather surface; rail routes through Swe¬
den, conditional upon Swedish transit permission; the Baltic Sea route, but the
Finnish ports were of low capacity and icebound for four to five months annual¬
ly. Lines of communication and supply in Finland were equally problematic.
One single-track railway ran from Oulu to Kemi to Rovaniemi, with a connecting
line to Tornio. Rolling stock was scarce; Norwegian and German equipment was not
lr
compatable with Finnish guage; lack of shunting yards and railway personnel cre¬
ated delays in unloading; Finnish engines burned wood and thus their hauling ca¬
pability was low.^ Despite all improvements and expedients, the Finnish rail
system imposed a limit on any large scale offensive development. The road net
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was equally poor. The road system was thin; few roads were surfaced and few
bridges could support military equipment. Beyond the Soviet border, only five
east-west roads were suitable, due to the close nature of the terrain, for the
offensive operations - the Kotshkoma-Rukga^rvi road, the Kem-UM^^a-Suomussalmi
road, the Louhi-Kestenga-Kujsamo road, the Kandalaksha-Alakurti-Salla road, the
"Russian" Konivo-Titovka road.^9 The almost absolute lack of suitable roads and
the character of the virgin terrain in the north, along with the shortage of for¬
ces and lack of unified command, contributed much to the failure of the German
offensives.^®
On 6 June OKW issued its final timetable for Barbarossa. This document
noted the need to camouflage the attack applied only until 18 June, after which
the OKW assumed that the Soviets would unequivocally perceive the shape of the
movements. It noted that 1390 hours on 21 June was the latest time the operation
could be cancelled. The codeword for cancellation was designated ALTONA; the
word DORTMUND would signal that Barbarossa would proceed. The timetable speci¬
fied 0330 as H-hour for the crossing of Soviet frontiers by the Wehrmacht and the
initial Luftwaffe strikes. On 14 June, during a final day-long briefing of his
forty-five senior front-line commanders at the Reich Chancellery, Hitler advanced
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H-hour to 0300 of 22 June. On that day von Falkenhorst reported that Platin-
Op
fuchs would commence on B+7 (seven days after B-Tag) and Polarfuchs on B+9. On
17 June, the Barbarossa timetable was reconfirmed by the OKW.
On 11 June, after the June Buschenhagen-Kinzel visit, AOK Norwegen issued a
supplement to its April order integrating the Finnish units and operational or¬
ders for the Finnish III Corps. The III Corps was to provide offensive flank se¬
curity south of the Gen.Kdo. XXXVI zone. It was to attack from the vicinity of
Suomussalmi via Ukhta toward Kem with its main force and send a secondary force
from Ukhta via Kestenga to Luokhi. The Finnish 6th Division, advancing from the
vicinity of Kuusamo, would turn northeastward behind Salla toward the Tuntsa Riv¬
er near Al^akurt^i. The III Corps would be under the direct command of B.Finn.
9^
at Rovaniemi.^5
During the May and June conferences mention had been made of establishment
of an OKH Liaison Staff Nord. On 7 June the OKW approved the dispatch of the OKH
ok
nominee, General Waldemar Erfurth, as commandant of such a staff. On 11 June
Haider recorded that Erfurth had been ordered north to deal with all operative
and personnel questions in Helsinki.On the afternoon of 13 June, Erfurth and
or
Buschenhagen arrived by commercial plane at Helsinki. Erfurth was immediately
attached to Mannerheim's headquarters as the OKH representative. However, Er¬
furth and his staff, at Mannerheim's request, were "not to don uniform until the
commencement of war."^
On 9 June Ryti informed his cabinet that there was considerable likelihood
of a Soviet-Nazi war within two weeks, without mentioning Finland's probable role
oo
in the coming conflict. In this situation there seemed no choice but to order
partial mobilization; the order for mobilization of reservists for border secur¬
ity units was issued on 9 June.®9 The uncompleted fortified positions were occu¬
pied. The mobilization was done without public announcement or alarm. The
troops were called to the colors by individual notices. On 10 June the first
thirty thousand reservists were issued mobilization notices.9® On 10 June Hein-
richs informed Rossing of the partial mobilization and that full mobilization was
projected for 16 June; to avoid disorganization this date should not be modi¬
fied. 9^ On 13 June the Finnish parliament v/as informed of the move by Witting.9^
Finally, on 1*f June von Schulenburg in Moscow reported that he had learned of the
Finnish mobilization order; the AA v/as informed.95
Buschenhagen, who had arrived with Erfurth, on 13 June established B.Finn,
at Rovaniemi.9^ In order to avoid attracting Soviet attention von Falkenhorst
remained in Norway.95 In the interim, Colonel G. Muller commanded German forces
from B.Finn. On the day its mobilization orders v/ere issued, the Finnish III
Corps under General Siilasvuuo was placed under the command of von Falkenhorst.
Siilasvuo, while mobilization took place, was to repel "possible military opera-
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tions from the east into Finnish territory."9^ Mannerheim ordered Siilasvuo to
establish contact with the Field Marshal if he should receive German operational
orders.97 On 16 June B.Finn. presented Siilasvuo with these orders. The Finnish
divisions were to advance on the right flank of the Polarfuchs operation, striking
along the Kemijarvi railway line to the junction with the Murmansk railway. The
date for commencing operations was left unspecified.9^
In reaction to Erfurth's arrival, on 15 June the Finnish General Staff pro¬
posed that a Finnish liaison officer be attached to the OKH in Germany.99 On 16
June the proposal was accepted by the OKH. General Harald Ohquist was designated
to occupy this post and on 20 June was presented to Haider at Zossen. During this
brief meeting, Ohquist placed the wishes of the Finnish High Command on the OKH
record. He stated that Mannerheim desired the return of Siilasvuo's forces at
the earliest possible moment, that Finland could complete preparations in seven
days after notice was transmitted for the main Finnish advance, that the advance
would move east of Lake La^oc^a. Further, he noted the serious food shortage in
Finland and reported that mobilization had begun on 18 June.^O
At this stage of preparation, the Finnish General Staff suddenly exhibited
concern over the prospect of a diplomatic settlement that would leave Finland un¬
supported. On 12 June Rossing reported that the Finnish military wished to know
if there was a peaceful solution still possible.On 14 June Erfurth and Bus-
chenhagen visited Mannerheim, who declared that he could delay general mobiliza¬
tion until he had a firm commitment that there would be war or alternately, a
commitment that in the case of a negotiated settlement Finland's territorial de-
iop
sires would be fulfilled. An answer was expected by noon, 15 June. Erfurth
promised to contact the OKH; Buschenhagen, the OKW. Buschenhagen was ordered to
inform the Finnish officers, by the Fuhrer's personal order, that the first alter¬
native could be counted on "with certainty.Keitel authorized the Military
Attache DGH to state that "the demands and conditions raised by Finland concern¬
ing the measures to be taken are to be regarded as fulfilled.Erfurth advised
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Heinrichs of the Fuhrer's view. The general mobilization was ordered to commence
on 1? June.
On 17 June Adolf Hitler issued the final terse order to proceed with Barbar-
ossa.
Events accelerated. On 16 June Finnish frontier zones were evacuated, sixty
thousand citizens being shifted, and the mining of these zones begun.On 17
June, the same day that Finland declared her "political connection with the League
of Nations broken,"''0^ the general mobilization orders were issued. "The troops
were given strict orders to avoid any action which could give the Soviets an ex¬
cuse for alleging provocation."''0^ Also on 17 June, a German E-boat and minelayer
flotilla under Captain Butow arrived in Finnish harbors on the southern coast.
The same day Finland received an AA warning to halt any further sailing of mer¬
chant ships to Soviet ports. On 17 June the date and hour of B-Tag were inadver¬
tently revealed to the Finns by a field order from B.Finn, authorizing active re¬
connaissance of Soviet territory to commence as of 2:30 a.m. on 22 June. Later
that day, the Finnish High Command issued operational orders for the Aaland occu-
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pation, to occur as B-Tag dawned. On 17 June Kampfgruppe Nord was upgraded to
a division with the designation SS-Division Nord: at this time a divisional sup¬
ply staff, a reconnaissance unit, an antiaircraft battery, medical and communica¬
tions units were added and the new division was reinforced for Polarfuchs by SS-
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Infantry Regiment 9 and SS-Totenkopf-Standarte K.
On 18 June the orders for the main Finnish offensive were formalized. These
plans, xifhile not inconsistent with the wishes of the OKH, were not entirely in
accord with the spirit of the previous German-Finnish discussions, which was that
the Finnish forces should be held for commitment either east or west of Lake La-
Further, Heinrichs had often implied that the Finnish General Staff prefer¬
red an offensive to the east, while these orders detailed an offensive directed
westerly."'''^ Certainly the OKH still believed that the Finnish advance was to be
eastward. Directive 33, issued on 19 June, stated "It remains the task of the
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main Finnish forces, reinforced by most of the 163rd Division, to attack the enemy
opposing them with the main weight of attack east of Lake Ladoga and, later, in
conjunction with Army Group North, to destroy them.On the same day Erfurth
expressed to Heinrichs the OKH concern that the creation of a force capable of
striking north and east of Lake La^odja was being neglected by the Finnish command.
It was; Mannerheim favored the "Hiitola" offensive and was committing his troops
to its pursuit. Erfurth received no explanation. The Field Marshal listened po¬
litely to Erfurth's requests, but pursued his own plans.The problems inherent
in seperate commands were a reality. Mannerheim intended to go to war along side
the Reich, but he would use his own methods and only for the objectives he prefer¬
red.
The OKM and OKL preparations proceeded rapidly. On 17 June German naval ves¬
sels undertook the direct defense of Finnish territorial waters in the Baltic.
In the far north, the OKM predicted that shipping along the Arctic coast must be
halted until Soviet supremacy could be overcome. The occupation of Polarnyy and
Murmansk appeared the most likely means of reducing the effectiveness of Soviet
naval forces; Grand Admiral Raeder had long insisted on the occupation of Murmansk
as one of the prime requirements of the OKM.^"'^ In Kirkenes were some six hundred
OKM personnel for the creation of Sea Command T, Murmansk-Teriberka command, when
11 6
the port was cleared by AOK Norwegen. Naval operations began immediately; dur¬
ing the nights 18-19 June, 19-20 June, and 20-21 June the German minelayers
"Preussen", "Grille", "Skagerrak", and "Versailles" together with six craft of the
6th MS Flotilla laid the minefields Wartburg I-III, one thousand one hundred fifty
contact mines and one thousand eight hundred explosive floats, between Memel and
Oland. Finnish minelayers laid fields on 21 June near Manni and Jussaro."1^ On
18 June Luftflotte V was ordered by OKW to support Gebirgskorps Norwegen and
B.Finn, with the services of one fighter squadron, one Stuka flight, one bomber
squadron Ju88, and one reconnaissance flight. Again dispersal of effort resulted,
for the OKL was ordered to attack the Soviet Arctic Fleet, Soviet Arctic ports,
98
the Murmansk railway, the White Sea Canal, the Soviet air force and its airbases,
provide ground support for Polarfuchs and Platinfuchs, and maintain aerial recon-
i *18
naissance over the Finnish-Norwegian border and the Soviet-Finnish border. By
21 June forty-two Stukas, along with a fighter squadron and a long-range recon¬
naissance squadron were in Kirkenes. A reconnaissance flight was located forward
at Finnish bases.^9 fbk Kirkenes was brought to full activation. Antiaircraft
units included one mixed antiaircraft battery at Banak and one heavy battery and
one light battery at Kirkenes. The Finnish fields at Petsamo, Rovaniemi, and the
tactical base at Kemijarvi were stockpiled for OKL use. Liaison was to be supplied
through Erfurth's staff.^0
All of the Finnish and German military activity did not, of course, go unno¬
ticed by the Soviets. On 19 June P.G. Orlov concluded that a Nazi attack was im-
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minent and so warned S.I. Kabanov, the commanding officer of the Hanko base.
On the same day, the Soviet military attache and Orlov evacuated their families
from villas near the Hanko base.^2 However, the concern displayed by Orlov, and
many other lesser Soviet officials and officers, was not shared by their superiors.
Little was done to prepare for the German onslaught.
As 21 June dawned, the German and Finnish forces were in position: the Fin¬
nish IV Corps under Lieutenant General Oesch with its right flank on the Gulf of
Finland and its left on Vuoksi (the 8th, 10th, 12th and 4th Divisions); the Fin¬
nish II Corps under Major General Laatikainen between Vuoksi and Pyhajarvi (the
2nd, 18th, and 15th Divisions); the "Karelian Army" under Lieutenant General
Heinrichs consisting of the Finnish VII Corps under Major General Hagglund between
Pyhajarvi and Vartsila (the 19th and 7th Divisions), the Finnish VI Corps under
Major General Talvela between Vartsila and Korpiselt^a (the 11th and 5th Divisions
and 1st Jager Brigade), Group "Oinonen" in the area of Ilomantsi (the Finnish Cav¬
alry Brigade and 2nd Jager Brigade), and the Finnish 1st Division as a reserve;
the Finnish 14th Division in the region of Lieksa; the German 163rd Division in
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the area of Joensuu to serve as a general reserve; the Finnish 17th Division
facing Hanko; in the Suomussalmi-Kuusamo region the Finnish III Corps under Major
General Siilasvuo (the 3rd and 6th Divisions) ; German Gen.Kdo. XXXVI under Gen¬
eral Feige in the Kemijarvi region (the 169th Division and SS-Division Nord);"^
the German Gebirgskorps Norwegian in the region around Kirkenes.''^
On 21 June, at one p.m., the Fuhrer authorized the flash of "Dortmund". In
the afternoon Erfurth presented, officially, Heinrichs with the information that
German operations would commence on 22 June. The Finnish Chief of the General
Staff was, according to Erfurth, visibly surprised.^7 One would have imagined
that the time of such surprises was long past.
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Conclusion: June 19^1
"When the situation is obscure, attack." - Heinz Guderian.''
"In war there is never any chance for a second mistake." - Lemachus.^
At 3:00 a.m. on a cool Sunday, the Soviet envoy Dekanov and V.M. Berezhkov
were summoned to the Wilhelmstrasse. There von Eibbentrop informed them that the
German government regarded the existing situation at the Soviet-Nazi borders as a
threat to Germany. The situation was taken by the Fuhrer as evidence of the So¬
viet Union's intention to stab the German people in the back. The Fuhrer's deci¬
sion was final; German troops, as a defensive measure, had crossed the border into
the Soviet Union.5 Von Schulenburg delivered the same message to Molotov at dawn
in the Kremlin.
At 2:30 a.m. on 22 June, elements of GebirgsKorp Norwegen crossed the bor¬
der, the 2nd Geb.Div. taking up positions in the Liinahamari-Petsamo region and
the 3rd Geb.Div. along a line extending south to the vicinity of Luostari.^ Fin¬
nish units in the area were to automatically be placed under the authority of the
GebirgsKorps.5 The Soviet naval base at Hanko was attacked by OKL aircraft from
r
the south at dawn. In the afternoon the German minelayer group Nord under Com¬
mander von Schonermark (the 2nd MTB Flotilla, 5th MMS Flotilla, 1st MTB Flotilla,
and 3rd MTB Flotilla) laid mines along the Soviet Baltic coastal waters. The Fin¬
nish submarines "Iku Turso", "Vetehinen", and "Vesihiisi" took up OKM-assigned
stations in the gulf.? In the evening hours, AOK Norwegen ordered Platinfuchs
launched on 29 June and Polarfuchs initiated on 1 July, with the Finnish III Corps
crossing the border at 0200 and the German divisions at 1600 hours.® Staggered
timing of the strikes was employed for the purpose of making maximum air support
available for the initial assault in each sector. Hitler was able to announce,
with all honesty, that "United with their Finnish comrades, the fighters of the
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victory at Narvik are standing in the Northern Arctic. German divisions commanded
by the conqueror of Norway, in cooperation with the heroes of Finnish freedom un¬
der their Marshal, are protecting Finnish soil."9 Nor were the Finnish forces
idle. The occupation of the Aaland Islands functioned smoothly and was complete
by 9s30 a.m. At Hanko Soviet aircraft attacked Finnish shipping in local waters
and the Red Army batteries there opened fire on Finnish targets at 6:50 a.m. Fin¬
nish batteries were authorized to counter-battery. Von Blucher reported to the
AA that Soviet bombers had struck at the Finnish island of Alskar and the Finnish
10
i</arships "Jemari" and "Vainfiwioinen". The Finnish navy's request to be allowed
to lay mines in Soviet waters, however, was refused by Mannerheim's headquarters.
The Finnish High Command set the date for the "Hiitola" offensive for 28 June.
The closing move of the day was an order to stop Soviet transits to Hanko, on some
1 1
suitable pretext.
On 2b June Finland agreed to permit German aircraft to take off from Finnish
territory for operations against Soviet objectives and to permit ground reconnais¬
sance by AOK Norwegen units across the Soviet-Finnish border. On 2b June, with
AG Nord operations proceeding on schedual, the OKH instructed Erfurth to inform
the Finns that they were to prepare for an operation east of La$o^a by at least
six divisions with the weight of the attack on the left flank.^ Molotov had
already twice demanded confirmation of Finland's neutrality and accused Finland
of firing on Hanko and of overflights of Leningrad.^ On 25 June, by orders of a
Stavka directive, aircraft of the Northern Front Air Force, of the Air Force of
the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, and of the Air Force of the Northern Fleet struck at
nineteen airfields in Finland and north Norway where were stationed units of the
Luftwaffe and Finnish Air Force.^ At the frontier, the Soviets opened with in¬
fantry and artillery fire.^ On the evening of 25 June 19^11 the Finnish parli¬
ament confirmed that Finland had again been forced into a defensive war. The Fin¬
nish troops were authorized to return fire, but were prohibited from crossing the
frontier before midnight 28 June. The High Command headquarters were transferred
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to Mikkeli."1^ The cycle was complete.
The German objectives were never attained; Murmansk was never occupied, the
Murmansk railway was never effectively cut, AG Nord never linked with the Finnish
Army at the Svir River, Leningrad never fell. Every German strategic objective
in the north was unfulfilled. The failure can be traced to three reasons, all
interlocking: the unnecessary division of command, the lack of sufficient forces
and the dispersion of their efforts, the combat conditions - terrain, transporta¬
tion net, climate - in the Finnish theater. If a unified command had been a real¬
ity, the offensive operations could have been mutually supportive in both timing
and objective. If sufficient forces had been available, if the defense of Norway
had not been an obsession, the advances would not have bogged down. If the forces
that were available had not been scattered into several operations, one massive
drive might well have reached its objectives. Given these two errors in planning,
the quality of the Finnish front precluded any exploitation of local advantages
gained during combat. And the terrain and the transport/supply system could not
support blitzkrieg tactics. German military strategy in Finland must be rated a
dismal failure.
"He conquers who endures." - Persius."'?
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The following lists the OKW/OKH codename, the month in which first
proposed, and a brief description of objectives for the operations of





the occupation of and defense of the
Petsamo region of Finland by forces
under the command of GebirgsKorps
Norwegen
the offensive extension of Renntier;
a strike at the Titovka-Murman coast-
Murmansk region of Soviet Russia by
forces under the command of Gebirgs¬
Korps Norwegen
the initial strike in the Salla region
of the Soviet Union and the extension
of such an offensive in the direction
of Kandalaksha by forces under the
command of B.Finn (Rovaniemi)
the covering codename for the Renntier,
Polarfuchs, and Platinfuchs operations
and all supportive troop movements and
concentrations
Blaufuchs I May 1941
Blaufuchs II May 1941
the movement and concentration of CKW
forces from northern Norway to the
region round Rovaniemi
the movement and concentration of OKW
forces from Germany via the Finnish
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